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Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American
Samoa and the Last U.S. Nationals
by SEAN MORRISON*
Introduction
Birthright citizenship in America is largely taken for granted.
When discussions of citizenship do arise, they are invariably in the
context of immigration-either granting or denying this exclusive
status to aliens. The general assumption is that one is either an
American citizen or a foreign alien. But what about those who are
neither foreign nor domestic? Most Americans would hardly believe
that the United States maintains an old immigration status of U.S.
"national" that provides fewer rights than to citizens. If Americans
knew that the distinction between an American "citizen" and a
"national" originally distinguished desirable races from undesirable
ones, they would be outraged. Yet, this second-class status continues
to exist for a small group of Americans. American Samoans are the
only people left with the U.S. national status, despite being
Americans for over a century.
American Samoa is the last unorganized, unincorporated
territory of the United States. It is also one of the great guardians of
Polynesian culture. The territory is truly both American and Samoan.
Modern homes and cars surround traditional fales, or Samoan
meeting houses. One house of the legislature consists of elected
representatives, the other of traditional elders. An American judicial
system settles disputes over the succession of chief titles.
Government officials wear a jacket and tie along with a lavalava
(sarong) with sandals, while making deals in both English and
Samoan. However, being a part of two worlds can lead to legal grey
* Sean Morrison manages a solo practice and is the Chief Operating Officer for the
Caribbean Econonomic Development Alliance. Until 2012, he worked in American
Samoa, first as a criminal prosecutor and later as counsel for the American Samoa
Department of Commerce. He served two terms as President of the American Samoa Bar
Association. Morrison received his J.D. from Case Western Reserve University School of
Law.
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areas. Since the annexation of the territory in 1900, the people of
American Samoa have been denied U.S. citizenship. Instead, they
remain the last to be classified as U.S. nationals. Like citizens,
nationals are part of the American polity, but they do not have all of
the same rights and privileges.
On July 10, 2012, the Constitutional Accountability Center filed
the case of Tuaua v. United States in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. The complaint sought recognition from the
State Department that persons born in American Samoa are citizens
by virtue of the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs included five U.S. nationals born in American Samoa
who had, in one way or another, been harmed due to their noncitizen
status.2 The complaint relied almost exclusively on the doctrine of jus
soli, which is the common law proposition that individuals born in the
territory of a nation are automatically citizens of that nation.
The United States, as defendants, moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to the territories.! It relied on a series of
Supreme Court decisions from the turn of the twentieth century,
collectively known as the Insular Cases.! These cases, the defendants
argued, specifically deny constitutional citizenship to those born in
the territories. For support, the defendants cited a series of circuit
court decisions denying Fourteenth Amendment citizenship to those
born in the Philippines during U.S. occupation. An amicus brief filed
by American Samoa Congressman Eni Faleomavaega sided with the
defendants against citizenship." He placed heavy emphasis on the
potentially destructive effects that citizenship could have on the
culture of American Samoa.9
1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 25-26, Tuaua v. United
States, No. 12-1143-RJL (D.D.C. July 10, 2012) [hereinafter Tuaua Complaint].
2. Id. at 4-12.
3. Id.
4. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint at 11-17, Tuaua v. United
States, No. 12-1143-RJL (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss].
5. Id. at 14-17.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Brief of the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-
1143-RJL (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Faleomavaega Amicus].
9. Id. at 12-18.
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On June 26, 2013, U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon dismissed
the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In his opinion,
Judge Leon largely followed the defendants' arguments and relied on
past cases suggesting that the Insular Cases denied constitutional
citizenship."
The plaintiffs' analysis suggested that the Insular Cases were
wrongly decided and should not be included in the analysis of the
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." They argued that
one should only look to the old common law, and ignore or overturn
the Insular Cases.12 Much of the substantial case law cited by the
plaintiffs was from before 1900.13 The defendants argued, and the
District Court agreed, that the Insular Cases absolutely bar
constitutional citizenship for those born in the territories.14 However,
this is a false all-or-nothing choice. Neither side is correct about the
impact of the Insular Cases on a provision like citizenship. In fact, it is
likely that constitutional citizenship could be granted to American
Samoans precisely because of the Insular Cases' incorporation
doctrine-not despite it. A better understanding of these cases
reveals a wide avenue for a court to grant citizenship without
threatening Samoan culture. By keeping within the doctrine of the
Insular Cases and their successors, there would be no need to
reinterpret or change existing Supreme Court precedent, and the
territories would maintain the significant cultural protections that
these cases provide.
The fact that the Tuaua case has been dismissed without full
analysis of the constitutional question means it is more important
than ever to fully consider the citizenship issue. Judge Leon's opinion
upheld the Insular Cases, but failed to truly analyze their effects on
citizenship. Instead, he relied on past practices to avoid the question
and simply denied citizenship outright. However, the Insular Cases
do not bar judicial application of citizenship. This matter is of vital
importance to the people of American Samoa and goes to the heart of
10. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *6-7 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2013).
11. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 25-33, Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 7,
2012) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition].
12. Id. at 12-24.
13. Id.
14. Tuaua, 2013 WL 3214961, at *6-7.
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what it means to be an American. It lies dormant for future cases or
appeals of this decision. Further, even without further litigation, a
proposed referendum of the issue may soon go before the people of
American Samoa," and they will need to have a thorough analysis of
the issues it raises. To date, most reports on citizenship in American
Samoa have kicked the analysis of issues down the road, for another
report or another study. This issue, however, is too important to
continue delaying.
This article examines the issue of constitutional citizenship as it
relates to American Samoa. Part I presents a history of American
Samoa and its status within the United States. Part II looks at the
difference between a citizen and a national, and explores why it
matters. Part III reviews the evolution of U.S. citizenship, from the
revolution to the Spanish-American War. Part IV reviews the Insular
Cases, and the doctrine they created. Part V outlines a framework for
applying constitutional provisions to the territories. Part VI discusses
some of the issues concerning American Samoa citizenship, and the
arguments used in Tuaua. Part VII uses the framework to analyze
constitutional citizenship as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment,
concluding that it can be applied to American Samoa without
overturning the Insular Cases. Finally, the conclusion discusses the
U.S. national status and provides a suggestion on how the
government should treat that designation in the future.
I. American Samoa
American Samoa is a series of seven islands deep in the South
Pacific.16 The largest island, Tutuila, is home to about 97% of the
population." Its Pago Pago Harbor is one of the finest natural
harbors in the world. American Samoa is part of the larger Samoan
Archipelago, which also includes the larger islands of Upolu and
Savaii that make up the Independent Nation of Samoa.
15. Congressman Supports Local Referendum (KHJ radio broadcast Oct. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.talanei.com/Congressman-supports-local-referendum/175
32050.
16. The islands are Tutuila, Aunu'u, Ofu, Olosega, Ta'u, Swains Island, and Rose
Atoll.
17. Population Map of American Samoa, U.S. CENSUS, 2010, www.census.gov
/schools/pdf/materials/cis-map_58AS.pdf (last visited Aug. 2013).
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A. Brief History of Samoa
The Samoan islands were originally settled around 3,000 years
ago by Polynesian settlers. Little is known about the early history of
the islands beyond what is derived from broken pottery and oral
myths. However, the later pre-European contact history is replete
with evidence of significant trade and warfare throughout the Pacific
region. The ruins of defensive fortifications can be found throughout
the South Pacific, from Fiji to Samoa to Tonga, which periodically
fought for control of the region."
French Explorer Jean Frangois de Galaup de la P6rouse was the
first European to land on the island of Tutuila.'9 A monument still
stands at the aptly named Massacre Bay where his men fought with
the Samoans. 20 The British came in 1791, followed by the Germans in
1824. Americans began arriving in 1839, noting the strategic value of
Pago Harbor as a Pacific coaling station and the growing landed
gentry, who bought land cheaply with weapons to fuel the ongoing
civil wars of the Samoans. In 1872, the United States won exclusive
control of Pago Harbor in exchange for protection of the people of
Pago Pago from the civil wars and foreign intrusions occurring
throughout the islands. Two years later, the Samoan chiefs boldly
requested that the United States annex the islands in an attempt to
protect Samoan lands from foreign alienation.2 1
While the United States barely acknowledged the request at the
time, it did begin to notice Germany's increased interest in the islands
22over the next few years. By 1889, Germany's maneuvering to
become sovereign over Samoa led to enough American and British
unease to push the three countries towards war. While the Samoans
fought their own civil war on land, the United States and Britain lined
up their warships against those of Germany in Apia Harbor on the
island of Upolu. The final showdown came that March, just in time
for a large cyclone, which sunk or severely damaged almost all of the
ships." It took this disaster for the powers to "recognize that not the
18. American Samoa Historic Preservation Office, Cultural History of American
Samoa, http://www.ashpo.org/index.phplhistory.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter ASHPO].
19. ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 412 (1989).
20. ASHPO, supra note 18.
21. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 19, at 412-13.
22. Id.
23. ROBERT Louis STEVENSON, A FOOTNOTE TO HISTORY: EIGHT YEARS OF
TROUBLE IN SAMOA 113 (Serenity Publishers, 2009) (1912).
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whole Samoan Archipelago was worth the loss in men and costly
ships already suffered."24
No longer having ships to fight, the parties grudgingly sat down
and signed the Treaty of Berlin, which divided administrative control
over the islands between the three great powers, while establishing a
formal king of Samoa that all parties would recognize.' The powers
of this king were dubious at best. The acclaimed author Robert Louis
Stevenson, who lived in the Samoan town of Apia during this time,
described the king as follows:
He can so sign himself on proclamations, which it does
not follow that any one will heed. He can summon
parliaments; it does not follow that they will assemble.
If he be too flagrantly disobeyed, he can go to war.
But so could he before, when he was only the chief of
certain provinces ... [I]n so far as he is king of Samoa,
I cannot find but what the president of a college
debating society is a far more formidable officer.26
The new system and new king did nothing to relieve tensions,
either between the great powers or the Samoans. Finally, a new
agreement was reached with the Tripartite Convention of 1899, in
which the United States and Britain gave up rights to the western
islands, and Germany gave up rights to the eastern islands, dividing
the archipelago forever.27 Germany eventually lost Western Samoa to
New Zealand after World War I.' Western Samoa gained
independence in 1962 and is today known just as Samoa.29
With control of Eastern Samoa firmly vested in the United
States, the Navy was tasked with administration of the islands. 0 To
24. Id. at 120.
25. Arnold H. Leibowitz, American Samoa: Decline of a Culture, 10 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 220, 229 (1980) (citing General Act Providing for the Neutrality and Autonomous
Government of the Samoan Islands, June 14, 1889, 26 Stat. 1497, T.S. No. 313).
26. STEVENSON, supra note 23, at 11.
27. Convention between the United States, Germany, and Great Britain
Governments in Respect to Samoa, Dec. 2, 1899, 31 Stat. 1878, T.S. No. 314, available at
www.asbar.org (from the "legal resources" drop-down menu, select "organic documents;"
click the hyperlink entitled "Convention of 1899").
28. ASHPO, supra note 18.
29. Leibowitz, American Samoa, supra note 25, at 220.
30. Exec. Order No. 125-A, Placing Certain Islands of the Samoan Group Under the
Control of the Navy Department (Feb. 19, 1900).
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bolster the legitimacy of the new order, the high Samoan chiefs signed
the Instrument of Cession of Tutuila in 1900.1 The small island group
of Manu'a followed with their own Instrument of Cession in 1904.
The Instruments of Cession granted sovereignty to the United States,
but protected the communal land and the power of the Samoan
chiefs, generally known as matai. Through these provisions, the
Samoans created a sort of political autonomy by protecting the matai
in their role as social and village leaders." The Navy imposed racially
restrictive laws on property ownership to protect the Samoans' land
system, while also serving the United States by keeping out foreign
settlers, especially Germans.34
While the Navy protected the Samoan institutions, the Samoans
themselves were given very little say in the matter. The Instruments
largely served to recognize the status quo." The Executive Order
imposing the Navy's control of the islands actually came two months
before the first Instrument of Cession." Commander B. F. Tilly, the
first to oversee the new territory, was reported to have told the King
of Manu'a before their cession, "whether you come or not, the
authority of the United States is already proclaimed over this
island.""
Pago Pago is more than 2,500 miles from Hawaii, the nearest
U.S. neighbor, which may explain the federal government's tendency
to overlook American Samoa. It took two years after the Cession of
Tutuila and Aunu'u before President Theodore Roosevelt responded
31. Instrument of Cession: Chiefs of Tutuila to United States Government, Apr. 17,
1900, available at www.asbar.org (from the "legal resources" drop-down menu, select
"organic documents;" click the hyperlink entitled "Cession of Tutuila and Aunu'u")
[hereinafter Tutuila Cession].
32. Instrument of Cession: Chiefs of Manua to United States Government, Jul. 16,
1904, available at www.asbar.org (from the "legal resources" drop-down menu, select
"organic documents;" click the hyperlink entitled "Cession of Manu'a Islands")
[hereinafter Manua Cession].
33. Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race versus Political
Identity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 828 (2008).
34. Id. at 827.
35. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 415.
36. Compare Executive Order No. 125-A, supra note 30, with Tutuila Cession, supra
note 31.
37. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 415. There is no longer a
Tuimanua, or King of Manu'a, because the last Tuimanua proclaimed that Jesus Christ
was the highest king in the land, so Jesus should have the title Himself. So far, nobody has
stepped forward to claim the title away from Jesus.
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with a "thank you" note and some gifts." While the Instruments were
signed in 1900 and 1904, Congress ratified neither until 1929." The
Navy governed the territory until 1951 when administrative power
was transferred to the Department of Interior.' In 1962, the
Secretary of Interior, by executive order, granted an American
Samoa Constitution, which was revised in 1967.41 The Constitution
allowed for an elected governor and legislature, returning de facto
control to the Samoans and enshrining the cultural institutions of the
people.
B. Samoan Life and Culture
Samoan life is still largely defined by the fa'asamoa, or Samoan
way.42 Institutionally, it is a mutually dependent relationship between
the aiga (family), the matai (chiefs), and communally held land. Each
aiga is tied to a matai title, which corresponds to an area of land. The
aiga selects a matai to hold that title, whose primary duty is to assign
the communal land to family members. The matai's power rests in
control over the land, without which he would have no authority.
That is the basis of the fa'asamoa.43 It is this complex relationship
that the Samoans sought to protect in the Instruments of Cession.
Even today, family life revolves around the aiga. Often difficult
to describe in English," it is similar to an extended family system with
a very tight connection to the village and land. People identify very
closely with their aiga, which collectively control the life of the
village. It has been commonly noted that the strength of the aiga
system has suffered over the century-plus since coming under U.S.
administration.45 Especially difficult has been the growth in
population, which increased from around 5,000 in 1900 to over 55,000
38. Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court's Misreading of the
Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 169 (Nov. 2011).
39. 1929 Ratification Act, 45 Stat. 1253 (1929) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1661).
40. Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 C.F.R. 6417 (2013).
41. AM. SAM. CONST.
42. A.P. Lutali & William J. Stewart, A Chieftal System in Twentieth Century
America: Legal Aspects of the Matai System in the Territory of American Samoa, 4 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 387,388 (1974).
43. Id. at 388-94 (detailing the law of the matai).
44. One researcher attempted to describe the aiga as a "non-exogamous cognatic
descent group identified by the title of its eponymous founder." See Poumele v. Ma'ae, 2
Am. Samoa 2d 4, 5 n.2 (App. Div. 1984).
45. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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today.' It is difficult to maintain close ties when your family has
grown over tenfold.
The aiga is overseen by a hierarchy of chiefs known as matai. A
matai's title is directly connected with a specific plot of land dedicated
to the aiga. The aiga owes tautua, or service, to the matai, who in turn
manages the family and its land as a sort of trustee. The High Court
of American Samoa described the fa'amatai, or "way of the matai" as
follows:
The duties and responsibilities of a matai defy
common law labels. They are more than chiefs who
are merely leaders. They are more than trustees who
merely protect property. A matai has an awesome
responsibility to his family. He must protect it and its
lands. He acts for the family in its relations with
others. He gives individual family members advice,
direction and help. He administers the family affairs,
designates which members of the family will work
particular portions of the family land, and determines
where families will live. His relationship to his family
is a relationship not known to the common law.47
These titles are hotly contested and serve as an important symbol
of social ranking. The doctrine of fa'aloalo (showing respect),
controls most aspects of Samoan life and politics.' Of course,
American oversight has significantly influenced even this important
institution, often inadvertently. Today, the Mauga title is considered
the highest matai in American Samoa, though this is almost entirely
due to the fact that it rests in Pago Pago and thus acted as the go-to
41person for the U.S. Navy when dealing with Pago Harbor issues.
46. The 2010 population was 55,519. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census
Bureau Releases 2010 Census Population Counts for American Samoa (Aug. 24, 2011),
available at www.census.gov/2010census/news/releases/operations/cbll-cn177.html.
47. Poumele, 2 Am. Samoa 2d at 5.
48. This was recently displayed during a political dispute when former Governor
Togiola Tulafono told Senators to show him more respect because his matai title was
higher than any of theirs. Fili Sagapolutele, Gov Says Let Voters Decide How Senators are
Selected, SAMOA NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), www.samoanews.com/?q=node/8833&
quicktabs_3=1.
49. Lutali & Stewart, supra note 42, at 389 (citing Taufaasau v. Manuma, 4 Am.
Samoa 947 (App. Div. 1967)).
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More than 90% of the land in American Samoa is communally
owned.o Alienation of communal land is strictly regulated, to the
extent that the Governor himself must approve the sale." Fee simple,
or "freehold land," is extremely rare, especially as its very definition
in American Samoa requires it to have been freehold prior to the
Instruments of 1900." American Samoa does have a unique,
judicially created freehold called "individually owned land,"
ownership of which is limited to those with at least one-half Samoan
blood."
The cultural institutions have been integrated into the political
system as well. The Samoan legislature-the Fono-is bicameral,
with a lower House of Representatives, known as faipule, directly
elected by the people, and a Senate chosen among high-ranking
senior matai.4 The High Court of American Samoa was originally
founded by the first administrator of the new coaling station at Pago
Harbor in 1900, Navy Commander B. F. Tilly, who was also the first
Chief Justice." Today, the High Court retains its political
independence by being administered directly from the Department of
Interior. It is comprised of justices appointed by the Secretary of
Interior, as well as Associate Judges, who are not trained in law, but
are prominent matai." Their role as liaisons between Samoan custom
and the law is especially important in the Lands and Titles division of
the court, which adjudicates property and matai succession disputes."
50. Leibowitz, American Samoa, supra note 25. Similar numbers are reported on a
regular basis, but appear to be mostly speculation. Especially over the last few decades,
large amounts of land have been changed to the uniquely Samoan status of individually
owned land, which is similar to freehold, but has racial restrictions on ownership. No
study has been done recently to measure how much land has been turned into individually
owned land versus communal land. Part of the problem is that very few matai have
registered the land that they oversee, thus there is almost no data beyond oral (and often
disputed) histories about what areas constitute communal land.
51. AM. SAM. CODE ANN. § 37.0204.
52. AM. SAM. CODE ANN. § 37.0201. Most freehold land has, over time, been
converted back to communal land.
53. AM. SAM. CODE ANN. § 37.0204(b).
54. AM. SAM. CONST. art. I, § 3, art. II, §§ 3-4. The Senate has come under much
criticism recently for being undemocratic, with even the Governor calling for popular
elections. See Fili Sagapolutele, Governor States His Case Regarding Election of Senators,
SAMOA NEWS (Oct. 3 2012), www.samoanews.com/?q=node/10651.
55. Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United
States Territories: the Case of American Samoa, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 379, 385 (1991)
[hereinafter Laughlin, Constitutional Structure].
56. AM. SAM. CONST. art. III, § 3.
57. AM. SAM. CODE ANN. § 3.0240.
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C. Protecting the Fa'asamoa
The communal land and matai systems are such pillars of the
cultural system that there is a widespread fear that any change to the
political structure may affect their durability. Once the system of
land ownership is put in jeopardy, "the whole fiber, the whole pattern
of the Samoan way of life will be forever destroyed."" Similarly, a
threat to the matai hierarchy would undermine the very social fabric
of the nation, which would in turn dissolve the aiga. This is why the
protection of the matai and the land tenure system was a condition of
the Instrument of Cession" and explicitly stated as policy in the
American Samoa ConstitutionW
Arnold Leibowitz, a leading scholar on the territories, has
pointed out that in the century prior to U.S. administration, an
undisturbed culture was confronted with a new religion and moral
standards, a new legal system, modern weapons, land speculators, and
great power politics." Add to that the twentieth century's influx of
political changes, the introduction of American-style capitalism,
individualism, junk food, technology, etc. and it is easy to see the
threats facing the fa'asamoa. All three pillars of the fa'asamoa-the
aiga, matai, and communal land-are considered at risk. The culture
is so important to the people of American Samoa that they have
fought hard to shield it from foreign erosion. In so doing, they have
potentially given up many rights and benefits for which they would
otherwise be eligible.
This fear did not arise in a vacuum. Samoans have learned the
lessons of the native Hawaiians. When the United States came to
Hawaii and imposed laws and values based on individual land
ownership, the Hawaiian cultural system quickly broke down. Native
Hawaiians gave up highly valued beachfront property for next to
nothing. By the time the Hawaiians had integrated into the new
system, most of their land was gone-and their culture along with it.
While Hawaii is undergoing a cultural rebirth today, the last century
58. Haleck v. Lee, 4 Am. Samoa 519, 551 (1964). See also Corp. of Presiding Bishop
v. Hodel, 637 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 n.2 (D.D.C. 1986) aff'd, 830 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("Every Western power that has entered the Samoan islands, not just the United States, in
their official documents and treaties, has recognized what anyone who has ever visited
Samoa or knows anything about Samoa knows, that the culture is integrally involved in
communal ownership of land, and to upset or destroy that feature of Samoan society
would ultimately destroy the society.").
59. Tutuila Cession, supra note 31.
60. AM. SAM. CONST. art. I, § 3.
61. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 415.
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has left behind a stern warning to other cultures facing foreign
intrusion.
Many Samoans believe that increased federal presence on the
islands will challenge the laws protecting the cultural system.
American Samoans have fought against an organic act for the
territory, even after promises that their institutions and laws would
remain protected.62  In 2006, Representative Faleomavaega
introduced legislation in the House to create a Federal District Court
for American Samoa." The court would have had jurisdiction only to
the extent that the Constitution applied to American Samoa, would
be seated under the Ninth Circuit, and would have explicitly denied
federal jurisdiction over any matters dealing with communal land or
matai titles." Despite popular support, the Samoan legislature-the
Fono-passed resolutions in opposition, and Representative
Faleomavaega let the bill die in committee.65
Presently, there is a large backlash against the plaintiffs in Tuaua
v. United States for bringing this suit without community engagement
and support. Ironically, this movement is largely led by
Representative Faleomavaega, who took it upon himself to file
amicus briefs in opposition to the plaintiffs.' Just before the court's
dismissal, Representative Faleomavaega put forward legislation in
Congress to provide a federally authorized referendum in American
Samoa regarding citizenship. Whether this influenced the court's
decision is unclear.
The fear of federal intrusion is overwhelmingly focused on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Much of the
fa'asamoa is legally protected within American Samoa through
62. Michael W. Weaver, The Territory Federal Jurisdiction Forgot: The Question of
Greater Federal Jurisdiction in American Samoa, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 325, 347
(2008). An organic act is legislation that formally creates a governing body to manage
federal lands. In the territories, this generally means creating a territorial government.
The American Samoa Government was not sanctioned by legislation, but was created with
an Executive Order of the Secretary of Interior.
63. Federal District Court of American Samoa Act of 2006, H.R. 4711, 109th Cong.
(2006).
64. Weaver, supra note 62, at 362.
65. Id.
66. See Faleomavaega Amicus, supra note 8; Reply of the Honorable Eni F.H.
Faleomavaega as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, Tuaua v. United States, No.
12-1143-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Faleomavaega Reply].
67. Press Release, Rep. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Faleomavaega Announces Draft Bill
for Citizenship Plebiscite for American Samoa (June 4, 2013), available at http://www.
house.gov/list/press/asOOfaleomavaega/draftbillforcitizenship.html.
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different types of racial restrictions. For example, the law prohibits
ownership of any land to those with less than half "native blood,"
with "native" defined as a Samoan from American Samoa. 8
Similarly, a person must have at least one-half Samoan blood to
obtain the title of matai,69 which is required to hold public office in the
American Samoa Senate."o In fact, the American Samoa Constitution
mandates such racial preferences in everything from family
organization to Samoan-owned businesses.71  The Equal Protection
clause, it is feared, would put these laws in jeopardy through
heightened judicial scrutiny."
With such a heavy emphasis on race-based classifications and an
overwhelming belief that these rules are essential to protecting the
Samoan culture, it is easy to see why many American Samoans would
worry about the Equal Protection Clause. Some argue that anything
that could facilitate a challenge to these Samoan laws should be
stopped, even if it brings significant benefits to the Territory. Thus, a
district court was unacceptable because improved access to justice
could present an inexpensive opportunity to challenge aspects of the
fa'asamoa protections.73 It is on this basis that those who opposed the
Tuaua plaintiffs claimed that citizenship would somehow embolden
challenges against various aspects of Samoan culture. 74 Tellingly, this
is not an argument that the rights do not apply to American Samoa,
nor that the laws in question are constitutional, rather that it should
be too difficult and expensive for anyone to ever bring it to court.
It is further claimed that if the Equal Protection Clause applies
to American Samoa, then the entire U.S. Constitution would apply as
well, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Such a holding would certainly challenge the
68. AM. SAM. CODE ANN. § 37.0204(b).
69. AM. SAM. CODE ANN. § 1.0403.
70. AM. SAM. CONST. art. II, § 3.
71. See AM. SAM. CONsT. art. I, § 3 (setting forth the Policy Protective Clause).
72. Press Release, Rep. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Faleomavaega to file Amicus Curiae
brief against the Tuaua lawsuit (Nov. 2, 2012), available at http://www.manuatele.net
/enileni-4q12.html.
73. See WILLIAM 0. JENKINS, JR., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
AMERICAN SAMOA: ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SOME FEDERAL COURT OPTIONS 23-25,
GAO-08-1124T (2008); see also Weaver, supra note 62, at 358.
74. Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66, at 7-8.
75. Press Release, Rep. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Faleomavaega responds to Charles
V. Alailima claims about citizenship lawsuit (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.
manuatele.netlenileni-4ql2.html.
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constitutionality of laws in American Samoa from unelected matai
senators to the prohibition on abortion. However, these issues have
never been properly analyzed. In fact, these arguments are mostly
speculation that over a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence
known as the Insular Cases would be suddenly overturned." Were
that to be true, the potential fallout could be a threat to the
fa'asamoa. It is unlikely, however, that any court will overturn the
Insular Cases, which were upheld by the Supreme Court as recently as
2008. Instead, these cases actually provide an opportunity to grant
birthright citizenship to the people of American Samoa, without
threatening the fa'asamoa or the existing legal structure.
II. Citizen vs. National: Why is it Important?
All U.S. citizens are nationals, but not all nationals are citizens.
The designation of "national" was originally used to describe those
who were born within the United States territories, but who were not
granted full citizenship.78 However, Congress did not define the term
until 1940.79 Today, the status only applies to those born in American
Samoa.'
Why does this distinction matter at all? After all, U.S. nationals
still have the ability to travel freely throughout the United States;
they may serve in the armed forces; they have a nonvoting member of
Congress; and they are eligible for most federal benefits. For all
intents and purposes, nationals are supposed to be treated like
citizens."' While nationals from American Samoa do enjoy many of
the rights of citizens, they also suffer some problems due to their
confusing status.
76. Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66, at 8-11.
77. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
78. Rabang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 35 F.3d 1449, 1452 n.5 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1130 (1995).
79. Id.; see also Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(22) (1940) ("The term
'national of the United States' means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person
who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United
States.").
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1408 states that persons "shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the
United States at birth" if they are "born in an outlying possession of the United States."
"Outlying possession of the United States" is defined as American Samoa in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(29). This was more clearly articulated by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg in Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe only remaining
noncitizen nationals are residents of American Samoa and Swains Island.").
81. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1904).
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The complaint in Tuaua v. United States presented an exhaustive
list of such grievances.82 For example, nationals and all those coming
from American Samoa must pass through federal immigration, as if
they had landed from a foreign country." Nationals may become
citizens, but only through the same naturalization process that aliens
are subjected to. This process prohibits minors and remains lengthy
and expensive, sometimes taking up to a year with no guarantee of
success. Like aliens, nationals must pass the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service ("USCIS") English and civics test (American
Samoa schools are taught in English and are funded by the U.S.
Department of Education), receive a determination of good moral
character through fingerprinting and interviews, and take the Oath of
Allegiance required from aliens (the Instruments of Cession already
declared territory-wide allegiance to the United States). The
immigration processing fees alone total $680." For a land where the
per capita income is only about $8,000," these costs can be
prohibitive. Until 1986, the law was so bizarre that it actually left
those who were born outside of American Samoa, but with only one
American Samoan parent, completely stateless.
Since American Samoa is primarily made up of nationals, having
such a status in the territory does not carry much hardship. However,
a national living in the mainland United States may face a number of
obstacles to basic rights and opportunities. Some states deny
nationals the right to vote, hold public office, or serve on a jury."
Others deny nationals the right to bear arms." Many state and
federal jobs require U.S. citizenship, which prohibits nationals from
taking those jobs." Citizenship is also required to be an officer in the
82. Tuaua Complaint, supra note 1.
83. Id. (stating that prior to 1952, nationals were prohibited from naturalizing).
84. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *2 (D.D.C. June
26, 2013).
85. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK: AMERICAN SAMOA
(Apr. 8, 2013), www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aq.html.
86. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 450.
87. Tuaua Complaint, supra note 1, at 22 (citing HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1 (right to
vote); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 25 (right to hold office); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.070
(right to serve as juror)).
88. Tuaua Complaint, supra note 1, at 23 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2(d)).
89. Id. at 22 (citing CAL. GOv'T CODE § 1031 (public safety officers); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 41.08.060-70 (firefighters and civil service); HAW. REV. STAT. § 121-14 (Hawaii
National Guard officers); and 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1109 (public school teachers)).
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U.S. armed forces," even though American Samoans provide more
than their fair share of soldiers.1 These complaints are not new, as
U.S. nationals from American Samoa have long complained about
this type of discrimination?
The plaintiffs in Tuaua also emphasized the fact that a national's
passport has a special Endorsement Code 09 that expressly states that
the individual is not a U.S. citizen.93 The plaintiffs claimed that this
was an example of nationals being treated "inferior and subordinate"
to citizens. 94 Tellingly, the United States acknowledged all of these
facts in its responses and motions.95 The court did not discuss these
facts other than as background. 96
A. American Samoa Citizenship
While today many in American Samoa are concerned about the
side effects of citizenship, this was not the case when American
Samoa first joined the United States. When the original chiefs ceded
their land to the United States in 1900, they believed that citizenship
was part of the bargain. They learned they were not citizens only
when Lt. Cmdr. C. H. Boucher informed them in the 1920s.9
90. Id. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, Reg. 601-100, Appointment of Commissioned
and Warrant Officers in the Regular Army, § II(1-5)(a), (Dec. 21, 2006) ("An original
appointment as a commissioned officer in the RA may be given only to a person who is a
citizen of the United States.").
91. See e.g., Kirsten Scharnberg, Young Samoans have little choice but to enlist,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER (Mar. 21, 2007), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2007
/Mar/21/In/FP703210396.html (during the second Iraq war, American Samoa suffered
more deaths per capita than any other U.S. jurisdiction); STATEMASTER.COM, "Iraqi War
Casualties (per capita) (most recent) by state," www.StateMaster.com/graph/mil-ira war_
cas.percap-iraqi-war-casualties-per-capita (last visited Oct. 12, 2013); IRAQ COALITION
CASUALTY COUNT, icasualties.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
92. See, e.g., Study Mission to Eastern [American] Samoa, Report of Senators Long
and Gruening to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, S. DOc. No. 38,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 126 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 Study Mission].
93. Tuaua Complaint, supra note 1, at 23.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4; Defendants' Reply in Support of
Their Motion to Dismiss, Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2012).
96. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *2 (D.D.C. June
26, 2013).
97. See Statement of Chief Liu, Hearings Before the Commission Appointed by the
President of the United States (American Samoa Commission), Sept. 18-20, 1930 in
Honolulu, Sept. 26-30, 2013, Oct. 1-4, 1930, in American Samoa (U.S. G.P.O. 1931) at 229
(hereinafter 1930 Hearings). Chief Liu stated that Boucher was court martialed for
"promoting unrest" among the Samoans to start the Mau movement. Id. at 351-52.
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The Samoans' realization that they were not U.S. citizens helped
propel the Mau (opposition) movement of the 1920s. The Mau
organizers demanded a larger role for Samoan governance, but also a
stronger relationship with the United States, which would include an
organic act passed by Congress formally organizing the territory and
full U.S. citizenship. The Mau argued that Samoans should have had
citizenship since the President signed the papers acknowledging
annexation of the islands." They organized a campaign for
citizenship with overwhelming support from the people and the
matai.9
A U.S. Senate Commission, which included American Samoan
Chief Mauga-one of the original signers of the Instrument of
Cession-studied the matter. In its 1931 report, the Commission
recommended an organic act with citizenship for American Samoans,
but also protections for the land system and fa'asamoa.'o It believed
that citizenship could be granted without affecting the unincorporated
status of the territory. While the Senate twice adopted the
recommendations, the measure failed in the House due to opposition
from the Navy.o' Thus, American Samoans remained as nationals,
despite overwhelming support from the people of American Samoa
and the U.S. Senate.
After World War II, the American Samoan desire for U.S.
citizenship turned into a fear of the U.S. Constitution. The 1931
report listed a number of potential deleterious effects to the culture
that the Samoans were previously unaware of. Having learned them,
many Samoans now had an aversion to a closer connection with the
U.S. In 1948, more than ninety matai petitioned Congress to table for
ten years any legislation dealing with citizenship or an organic act.'02
Thus, no changes were made when the Department of Interior took
control of the administration in 1951.
Another Senate study in 1961 noted that Samoans desired U.S.
citizenship, but feared that if they became citizens they would not be
able to prevent other U.S. citizens from coming and taking their
land.'03 To avoid losing the Samoan culture, any organic act would
98. Statement of Alex T. Willis, id. at 207.
99. See generally, id.
100. Decision of Commission, id. at 268-70.
101. Dudley 0. McGovney, Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They?, 22 CALIF. L.
REV. 593, 630 (1934).
102. Leibowitz, American Samoa, supra note 25, at 242.
103. 1961 Study Mission, supra note 92, at 9.
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have to first address two questions: (1) whether the act would protect
the fa'asamoa; and (2) whether such an act would be constitutional.on
This conflict between culture and political status reared its head again
in the 1969 American Samoa Political Status Commission, which
recommended that the territory remain unorganized and
unincorporated.'o
B. Constitutional vs. Statutory Citizenship
American Samoa is the only U.S. territory without citizenship,
primarily because it is the only remaining unorganized territory.
Organization occurs when Congress passes an organic act, formally
establishing a government for the territory. In the past, organic acts
for territories have included citizenship, though this is not a
requirement for organization.'" This citizenship granted by Congress
is referred to as "statutory citizenship," distinct from "constitutional
citizenship" that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The difference between statutory and constitutional citizenship is
important because the political status of American Samoa, and all the
territories, is perpetually in question. Most American Samoan
nationals do not realize that severing the territory's ties to the United
States could put their current "citizen" or "national" status in
jeopardy. In 1998 Congress debated the Young Bill, which would
have forced Puerto Rico to come to a final decision as to whether it
should be a state or an independent nation. The Bill included a
provision that if Puerto Rico chose to be independent, Congress
would automatically revoke the U.S. citizenship of Puerto Ricans.'"
A suit for declaratory relief regarding the citizenship question was
dismissed as unripe." However, in 2005, the President's Task Force
104. Id. at 129.
105. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 461.
106. Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. § 14211 (1950) (repealed and re-enacted by
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1407 (1952)); Approval of Covenant
to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1801, art. III
(1976); Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1541 (1954). Puerto Rico
was organized by the Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act), 48 U.S.C. §§ 733, 736, 738-40,
744 (1994) (original version at ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900), but citizenship was not granted
until the amendments of the Jones-Shafroth Act (Jones Act), ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
107. Lisa Maria Perez, Note, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2008) (citing H.R. 856, 105th Congress, §
4(a)(B)(4) (1997)). See also Efron v. United States, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
Although the Young Bill passed the House of Representatives by a one-vote margin of
209-208, it ultimately died after failing to reach a vote in the Senate.
108. Perez, supra note 107, at 1032 (citing Efron, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1468).
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on Puerto Rico's Status confirmed that independence would cause
those born in Puerto Rico to automatically lose citizenship.'9
On the other hand, Congress cannot revoke constitutional
citizenship. In Afroyim v. Rusk,"o the Supreme Court stated that, "in
our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot
sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.""
However, in Rogers v. Bellei, the Court explained that this protection
from forced denaturalization does not apply to statutory citizens."2 In
fact, those granted citizenship by statute could actually have their
citizenship revoked."'
C. Natural Born Status
Constitutional citizenship also suggests that one who is granted
birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment is also a
"natural born citizen"-a prerequisite to become President of the
United States.114 This is more than a merely academic question.
There have been many examples of this issue arising: John Nance
Garner was Vice President under President Franklin Roosevelt's first
two terms, but he was born in Texas before its re-annexation into the
Union after the Civil War."' Barry Goldwater ran for president in
1964, but was born in the Arizona territory three years prior to
statehood; his eligibility was not challenged. George Romney ran in
1968, but pulled out of the election when critics pointed out that he
was born in Mexico to American missionaries. In 2008, John
McCain's candidacy went unchallenged, but scholars noted that he
was born in the Panama Canal Zone when it was a U.S. possession."6
109. Id. at 1033 (citing President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status, Report by the
President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status (2005)).
110. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
111. Id.
112. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 836 (1971).
113. Id.
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
115. John R. Hein, Comment, Born in the U.S.A., but Not Natural Born: How
Congressional Territorial Policy Bars Native-Born Puerto Ricans From the Presidency, 11
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 435 (2009).
116. Id. at 425-26. See also James C. Ho, Unnatural Born Citizens and Acting
Presidents, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 575,579 (2000) (arguing that although McCain was born
in the Canal Zone, he is a natural born citizen under the common law). Ho's argument
assumed that a pure form of jus soli applies, since Panama was under U.S. jurisdiction at
the time, but never considered the Insular Cases. Id. If one were to follow Judge Leon's
reading of the incorporation doctrine, then the Panama Canal zone would not have been
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Just recently, potential presidential candidate Senator Ted Cruz was
forced to renounce his Canadian citizenship when it was discovered
that he was born in Calgary."' What if an American Samoan ran for
president?
The presidential clause is the only section of the Constitution
that identifies "natural born" rather than just "citizens." This
suggests that being "natural born" is an additional requirement for
the presidency. It also suggests a stark contrast between a natural
born citizen and a naturalized citizen. If naturalized citizens are
prohibited from the presidency, and American Samoans may only
become citizens through naturalization, then one born as a U.S.
national can never be president.
Adam Clanton, a former clerk to the High Court of American
Samoa, argued that the common law doctrine of jus soli-that anyone
born on soil under the sovereignty of the United States is a citizen-
would overcome any challenge to an American Samoan candidate."
Problematically, this approach leads to the absurd result that an
American Samoan could be a "natural born citizen" under jus soli,
yet not a citizen under the immigration law. The only way for an
American Samoan to be accepted as natural born would be through
birthright constitutional citizenship, or a change to the immigration
law.
III. History of Citizenship in America
In order to understand citizenship for American Samoa, it is
important to first understand the broader concepts of citizenship
within the United States. This section will explore the history of
citizenship in America, from its doctrines in English common law to
the Dred Scott case. Then it will examine the creation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and how courts interpreted its citizenship
clause up to the twentieth century. Finally, it will review citizenship
questions raised by the expansion into the insular territories, leading
up to the Supreme Court's holdings in the Insular Cases.
part of the United States, and as such, Senator McCain would not be a natural born
citizen.
117. Todd J. Gillman, Dual Citizenship May Pose Problem if Ted Cruz Seeks
Presidency, DALLAS NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.dallasnews.comnews/politics/
headlines/20130818-dual-citizenship-may-pose-problem-if-ted-cruz-seeks-presidency.ece.
118. Adam Clanton, Born to Run: Can an American Samoan Become President?, 29
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 135, 147-48 (2011).
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A. The Common Law Doctrine of Jus Soli
Citizenship in the United States was traditionally based on the
English common law doctrine of jus soli, which holds that anyone
born within the territorial domain of the sovereign and not subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of another state is a citizen."' Sir Edward
Coke first detailed the doctrine in Calvin's Case, which involved an
individual born in Scotland after James I of England had taken over
the Scottish throne.' 20 The bench found that anyone born within any
territory ruled by the King of England was a subject of the King and
entitled to full English benefits.12' Blackstone later defined the
requirements for subjectship as birth within the territory of the
empire and allegiance to the King.12
The English common law did not consider race or location, so
long as the individual was born in an area within the British Empire."
Further, there was only one type of subject, which was an important
distinction from the Roman law's various degrees of citizenship.24
As part of the British Empire, those born in the American
colonies were automatic British subjects with all the rights and
privileges of such.' After independence, American law adopted
English common law, including the doctrine of jus soli.126 The new
United States shed the use of the word "subject" in exchange for
"citizen." While the new Constitution never defined citizenship, the
change in phrase distinguished one who is subject to a monarchy, and
one who is a sovereign in a republic.127 This change also reflects a
philosophical difference in that the new nation believed that a citizen
was bound in contract to the nation-with the citizen pledging
119. Perez, supra note 107, at 1031 (explaining citizenship is also sometimes based on
jus sanguinis, or citizenship which follows the parents' status, but that is not important for
this article).
120. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
121. Id. at 406-07.
122. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *366.
123. Perez, supra note 107, at 1048.
124. Id. at 1047.
125. See Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 120-21 (1830) ("It is universally
admitted both in the English courts and in those of our own country that all persons born
within the colonies of North America whilst subject to the Crown of Great Britain were
natural born British subjects.").
126. Id.
127. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166 (1875) ("Citizen is now more commonly
employed, however, and as it has been considered better suited to the description of one
living under a republican government.").
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allegiance to the country, and the country protecting the rights of the
citizen.'" It is a word that made its membership equal to all those
under the flag.'29 In 1793, Chief Justice John Jay described the new
citizenship as such: "[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on
the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they
are sovereigns without subjects ... and have none to govern but
themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and
as joint tenants in the sovereignty."'30
While the word changed, the core concepts of "citizenship" did
not. Like the English, there were no separate classes or categories of
citizenship in the United States.13 ' The new Constitution referred to
"natural born citizens," which had the same meaning as the English
"natural born subjects." 132  For example, Supreme Court Justice
Swayne, sitting in a circuit court, stated that:
All persons born in the allegiance of the king are
natural born subjects, and all persons born in the
allegiance of the United States are natural born
citizens ....
... We find no warrant for the opinion that this great
principle of the common law has ever been changed in
the United States.33
This understanding of jurisdiction and allegiance did not
distinguish between the political statuses of the territories throughout
the United States. While there were states, territories, and districts,
they all constituted the United States. Chief Justice Marshall
explained in Loughborough v. Blake that the United States was
"composed of States and territories. The District of Columbia, or the
territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States than
Maryland or Pennsylvania."'3 More specifically, Justice Joseph Story,
128. James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship in the
Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 208, 221
(1974).
129. Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of Citizenship, 84 J. AM. HIST. 833, 834 (1997).
130. Chisholm v. Ga., 2 U.S. 419, 471-72 (1793) (Jay, J., concurring).
131. Kerber, supra note 129, at 834.
132. Clanton, supra note 118, at 143-44.
133. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 789 (C.C. Ky. 1866) (quoted by United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1898)).
134. Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 319 (1820).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:192
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE
sitting on the circuit court, stated that "[a] citizen of one of our
territories is a citizen of the United States.""' The United States
carried on the English common law tradition as it related to
citizenship. Since anyone born in a colony of Great Britain was an
English subject, then anyone born in a colony or territory of the
United States was a U.S. citizen.
B. Dred Scott and the Non-Citizen
While citizenship in America was well understood as it related to
white landowners, it was less certain for the rest of the country. In
1856 the Supreme Court, in the now infamous Dred Scott case, held
that the natural-born descendants of slaves could not be U.S. citizens
under the Constitution."' Chief Justice Taney related how African
slaves and freemen constituted an "inferior class" that could not be
part of the citizenship unless the "dominant race" granted such rights
to them."' Despite being both born within the United States and
owing allegiance, African Americans were not considered citizens.
The decision challenged the common law doctrine of jus soli by
adding a racial element.
Dred Scott also had an important holding regarding American
expansion: "[T]here is certainly no power given by the Constitution to
the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering
on the United States or at a distance" except to be treated as
temporary territories until such time as the people there were ready
to become a state."" While the court recognized the power of the
federal government to govern these territories as it chose, Congress
was still subject to all the restrictions of the Constitution. "9 In other
words, the territorial clause in Article IV did not convey powers to
Congress beyond the Constitution's controls. This expressed the
doctrine of ex proprio vigore, commonly described as "the
Constitution follows the flag."'m American jurisprudence had always
recognized that the Constitution applied equally in all places under
the nation's jurisdiction. While the concept was obvious to jurists at
the time, it would be challenged by the end of the century.
135. Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.Cas. 609, 616 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
136. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1856).
137. Id. at 404-05.
138. Id. at 446-48.
139. Id. at 449-50.
140. Laughlin, Constitutional Structure, supra note 55, at 423.
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C. The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
After the Civil War, the Dred Scott decision was foremost in the
minds of the Civil War Amendments' drafters. To overturn the
decision, the nation first adopted the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibiting slavery. However, many Southern states implemented
"Black Laws" which stripped the newly freed slaves of the basic rights
of citizenship, such as voting, speech, movement, and bearing arms.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 attempted to grant citizenship through
statute, but was not enough to overcome Dred Scott. For that, a
constitutional amendment was required.14 1
The new Fourteenth Amendment used broad language to
declare: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside."1 42 Through the amendment, the
common law doctrine of jus soli citizenship, as expounded by
Blackstone, was restored. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment's
citizenship clause was designed to remove the caste system and
"pestilent doctrines of the Dred Scott case., 143 It would accomplish
this by prohibiting future legislators or judges from changing the
meaning of citizenship.'" The amendment was written broadly to
encompass all people throughout the entire United States. Senator
Lyman Trumball, who was part of the drafting team, explained that
section two of the Amendment referred to "no persons except those
in the States of the union; but the [citizenship clause] refers to
persons everywhere, whether in the States or in the Territories or in
the District of Columbia." 145
141. Nicole Newman, Note, Birthright Citizenship: The Fourteenth Amendment's
Continuing Protection Against an American Caste System, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 437,
447-48 (2008).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 11, at 16 (citing Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890, 2896 at 1116 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)). See also
Newman, supra note 141, at 448 (discussing how the Fourteenth Amendment meant "to
eliminate racial caste systems in southern states").
144. Perez, supra note 107, at 1035. See also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262
(1967) (reasoning that "[the amendment] provides its own constitutional rule in language
calculated completely to control the status of citizenship").
145. Tuaua Complaint, supra note 1, at 17.
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D. Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship in the Courts
For the remainder of the century, with the exception of Native
Americans,'" the common law principle of jus soli as stated by the
Fourteenth Amendment was uniformly upheld throughout the
United States.14 7 In the Slaughter-House Cases,"' the Supreme Court
understood the citizenship clause in the same way as Senator
Trumball. The opinion recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
distinguished between citizens of the United States, and citizens of a
particular state.149 As such, it was specifically framed to eliminate the
old argument that those not born in the states, but born in "the
District of Columbia or in the Territories, though within the United
States, were not citizens."'o
In 1898, just a couple of years before American Samoa was
annexed to the United States, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Wong Kim Ark."' Wong Kim Ark had been born in
California to Chinese nationals working as laborers. Having lived his
whole life in the United States, he always believed himself to be a
citizen. When he was about twenty-one years old, he visited China.
Upon his return to the United States, the Immigration Service
declared that he was not a U.S. citizen and, thus, denied him
permission to land due to the Chinese Exclusion Act, which
prohibited those of Chinese origin from entering the country unless
they were citizens.'
The Supreme Court held that he was a U.S. citizen by virtue of
his birth on American soil. First relying on the Fourteenth
Amendment and recognizing that the citizenship clause "could not be
understood without reference to the common law,""' the Court then
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment reaffirmed the principles of
jus soli "in the most explicit and comprehensive terms."' While
Congress could regulate naturalization, the Amendment forbade
146. Native Americans born in the U.S. still did not become citizens due to the
sovereignty of the tribes. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). Instead, the principle of
jus sanguinis, that the child followed the status of the parent, applied. See McGovney,
supra note 101.
147. Perez, supra note 107, at 1054.
148. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
149. Id. at 73.
150. Id. at 72-73.
151. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
152. Id. at 652-53.
153. Id. at 654.
154. Id. at 675.
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restrictions on natural born citizens.' The only exceptions were for
the children born to foreign ambassadors or officials in the country,
the children of alien enemies during a hostile occupation, and Native
Americans (who were sovereign).5 The Court also reaffirmed the
Slaughter-House Cases' distinction between jurisdiction of a state and
jurisdiction of the United States.' One could be subject to the
United States' jurisdiction without being within the jurisdiction of a
particular (or any) state within the Union.
The Tuaua defendants claimed that Wong Kim Ark was
irrelevant because the plaintiff had been born in California, which is
indisputably part of the United States, whereas American Samoa is
not. However, Wong Kim Ark stood for the proposition that the
common law notion of jus soli was the law of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In including even the children of aliens who resided in
the United States temporarily, the Supreme Court stated: "Every
citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within
the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the
jurisdiction, of the United States.""' Therefore, a child born under
the jurisdiction of the United States, and owing allegiance and
protection to the United States, has met both requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
E. What to Do with the Islands?
When Wong Kim Ark was decided in March 1898, the territorial
boundaries of the United States were growing, but with the
understanding that all new territory would eventually become a state.
There were states, the District of Columbia-which was carved out of
states, and there were territories that would someday be states.
When determining the reach of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
had always followed the doctrine of ex proprio vigore and applied the
Constitution's provisions across the entire United States.
However, that same year brought about calls for changes to
those commonly understood categories. That July, Congress officially
annexed Hawaii as a territory of the United States.' In August, the
Spanish-American War ended after just four months, prompting
155. Id. at 702.
156. Id. at 655, 680-82 (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)).
157. Id. at 688.
158. Id. at 693.
159. Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United
States (Newlands Resolution), H.R.J. Res. 259, 55th Cong. (1898) (enacted).
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Ambassador John Hay to describe it as a "splendid little war."'" The
United States originally entered the war with the proclaimed purpose
of helping Cuba gain independence from Spain.'' Instead, with the
end of the war, the United States found itself with temporary
possession of Cuba as well as three new territories: Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines. A new nationwide debate over the
merits-and practicalities-of American expansion began.
Now that the United States had these territories, what would it
do with them? Supreme Court Justice Brewer drafted a pamphlet
outlining the options: (1) leave the new territories; (2) stay until the
inhabitants have organized into a stable government; (3) create a
protectorate leaving the inhabitants some internal autonomy; (4) sell
the islands for whatever we can get; (5) create colonies; or (6)
incorporate the inhabitants as American citizens. 62
Some spoke excitedly about an American empire, while others
opposed the concept on principle. The supporters of continued
growth were called the "expansionists" while those opposed were
called the "anti-imperialists."' 3  The argument was less about
expansion, but more about what would happen to the new territories
when annexed, as both sides believed that the United States had the
power to expand its boundaries.'" Racial concerns were central to
the arguments. Both sides worried that these "alien and savage
races" were not fit for citizenship."' The expansionists believed that
the Constitution, and citizenship, only applied to the extent that
Congress decreed, so it did not matter if expansion continued to the
islands.'" The anti-imperialists believed that the Constitution applied
ex proprio vigore.'67 Thus, the U.S. should not annex new territories
160. Michael Richman, A 'Splendid Little War' Built America's Empire, WASH. POST,
April 8, 1998, at HO1, available at http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/1898/WP-9-11-
1998.htm.
161. Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 806 (2005).
162. Frank E. Guerra Pujol, The Pamphlet Wars: the Original Debate Over
Citizenship in the Insular Territories, 38 REV. DER. P.R. 221, 221 (1999) (quoting DAVID
J. BREWER, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR: A PROPHECY OR AN EXCEPTION? 13-14
(1899)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2-3.
165. Id. at 2 (quoting Rep. Jonathan P. Dolliver from Iowa).
166. Id.
167. Id- at 5.
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for fear that the "semi-civilized" inhabitants would automatically
become citizens.16
The country was split as to what to do with the territories, and
the 1900 presidential election was largely considered a referendum on
McKinley's expansionist policies.169  However, before the newly
reelected McKinley made a decision on these questions, the Supreme
Court stepped in and came to its own conclusions.
IV. The Insular Cases and the Incorporation Doctrine
In 1901 the Supreme Court released a series of decisions
regarding the new island territories that came to be known as the
Insular Cases.'70 These closely watched cases gave blessing to the
expansionist policies of the McKinley administration and created a
new set of rules for governing territories."' The importance of the
cases was obvious at the time, but despite their significance, they are
hardly known today.
Essentially, the Insular Cases granted the McKinley
administration the leeway it needed to continue expansion and
govern as it saw fit, while also attempting to keep some semblance of
jus soli and ex proprio vigore intact. The Court described the
territories as neither foreign nor domestic, and as part of the United
States for some clauses of the Constitution, but not others. Such a
legal balancing act led humorist Finley Dunne's comic. strip character
Mr. Dooley to comment that, "no matter whether th' Constitution
follows th' flag or not, th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction
returns." 172
168. Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and
Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 412, 415
(1899).
169. Krishanti Vignaraja, The Political Roots of Judicial Legitimacy: Explaining the
Enduring Validity of the Insular Cases, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 781, 782 (2010).
170. The seven cases settled on May 27, 1901, included: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S.
221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182
U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S.
Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901). Later cases concerning the territories have also been included
under the umbrella term of "Insular Cases," though most scholars and courts do not
include cases decided after Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
171. Vignaraja, supra note 169, at 783.
172. Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Application of the Constitution in the United States
Territories: American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. HAw. L. REV. 337, 346 (1980)
[hereinafter Laughlin, Application of the Constitution] (quoting F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY
ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (E. Bander ed. 1963)).
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For example, De Lima v. Bidwell held that the territories were
not foreign.173 Downes v. Bidwell held that they were also not
domestic. 4  Thus, Puerto Rico was part of the United States for
purposes of the Uniformity Clause,"' but not for the Revenue
Clause.' Justice Edward White stumbled to explain this by saying
that Puerto Rico was "foreign to the United States in a domestic
sense."'77 At their heart, the Insular Cases recognized a new class of
"unincorporated" territories who enjoyed the protection of the
Constitution, but only for the most "fundamental rights."
The Insular Cases ended the era of Manifest Destiny, in which
the United States took new territory for the sake of expansion and
settlement. In its place was a new doctrine of political and military
control over lands never destined to become part of the union of
states. 9
A. Downes v. Bidwell: The Seminal Case
The central decision of the Insular Cases was Downes v.
Bidwell.'80 The controversy was whether merchandise brought to
New York from the new territory of Puerto Rico was exempt from
duty despite the Foraker Act, which required levies on articles
imported from foreign countries.'' The answer depended on the
interpretation of the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, which
stated that, "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."'2 Did the Uniformity Clause extend
ex proprio vigore to Puerto Rico? Were the territories part of the
United States? If so, then the Foraker Act's duties would be
unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, while the Court did come to a decision, the
answer was hardly clear or concrete. The case was decided by a 5-4
173. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 219.
174. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341-42, 346. Justice Brown wrote the opinion of the Court
in both De Lima and Downes, but came to different conclusions as to whether Puerto Rico
was part of the United States depending on the circumstances.
175. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 219.
176. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
177. Id. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring).
178. Laughlin, Application of the Constitution, supra note 172, at 346.
179. Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a Constitution that Follows the Flag, 80
Miss. L.J. 181, 204 (2010).
180. Downes, 182 U.S. 244.
181. Id. at 247-48.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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vote with five separate opinions and no majority. 3 This kind of
factionalism in the Supreme Court is common today, but was a rare
occurrence at the time. When the decision was issued, the New York
Herald described it as such:
No decision of more far reaching consequence has
ever been rendered by the United States Supreme
Court than that in the Downes case, and no great
constitutional opinion of that tribunal has rested on a
basis more insecure. It is not only opposed by the
largest minority of which the Court is capable, who
declare through the Chief Justice that it "overthrows
the basis of our constitutional law," but even the
majority, while coinciding in the conclusion, could not
agree in the reasoning by which it was reached."'
1. Justice Brown's Opinion of the Court
As the tie-breaking vote, Justice Brown wrote the "opinion of
the court," which no other justice joined. Justice Brown espoused the
Expansionists' view that the Constitution only applied to a new
territory to the extent that Congress allowed it, but that once it
applied, Congress could not revoke it."' He believed that the United
States could only be composed of States, so territories were never
included in the definition."
As part of the analysis, he compared the text of the Civil War
Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery
"within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction."'1
To Justice Brown, the latter part of the phrase suggested that there
might be places subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. without being
part of the Union." Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Amendment merely
183. Vignaraja, supra note 169, at 790.
184. Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Public Response to Controversial Supreme Court
Decisions: The Insular Cases, 30 J. SUP. Cr. HIST. 197, 204 (2005) (quoting NEW YORK
HERALD, 29 May 1901).
185. Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good
Idea-and Constitutional, 27 U. HAW. L. REv. 331, 343 (2004) [hereinafter Laughlin,
Cultural Preservation].
186. Downes, 182 U.S. at 250-51. Justice Brown did find an exception for the District
of Columbia, which he included in the United States.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
188. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251.
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conferred citizenship to "persons born or naturalized in the United
States ... and of the State wherein they reside."" 9 This wording did
not extend to persons born in those areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction
but not part of a state.'" Under this theory, statehood was required to
be part of the "United States." This was a change from the opinions
in the Slaughter-House Cases and Wong Kim Ark, which recognized a
difference between the United States and the individual states.
Taking his analysis beyond the confines of the issue at question,
Justice Brown declared that the territories were not part of the
"United States" under the Fourteenth Amendment, so those born in
the territories were, therefore, not birthright citizens.' He also
argued that the power to acquire territory entailed the power to
prescribe the terms of that acquisition. From a policy perspective, it
would be unlikely that Congress would ever annex territory if the
inhabitants, "whether savages or civilized," automatically became
citizens of the United States.'"
Justice Brown's arguments on citizenship are hardly persuasive.
Aside from the ominous echoes of Dred Scott's racial caste system
inherent in his opinion, he draws a line between the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, but does not justify why it was drawn
where it was. The text of the Thirteenth Amendment was
purposefully broad to completely eradicate slavery wherever the U.S.
could claim jurisdiction. As Justice Fuller stated in his dissent:
"Clearly this prohibition [on slavery] would have operated in the
territories if the concluding words had not been added."193
The use of the jurisdiction test in the Thirteenth Amendment
would clearly apply to the territories, but would equally apply to the
District of Columbia and the various possessions and protectorates.
It would even extend to places outside the territory-but under
American jurisdiction-like ships' or military bases like
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251.
191. Id. at 250-51.
192. Id. at 279-80.
193. Id. at 358 (Fuller, J., dissenting). Despite the clear wording of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Samoans have actually challenged whether it applies in American Samoa,
fearing that a prohibition of involuntary servitude would hurt the matai's ability to control
his family. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 426.
194. See In re Chung Fat, 96 F. 202, 203-04 (D. Wash. 1899) ("[I]f ... the petitioners
are being coerced to labor on board an American vessel against their will,... they are
being subjected to involuntary servitude within the United States, in violation of the
thirteenth amendment.").
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Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.'9' Justice Brown did not explain why the
Fourteenth Amendment stopped at the territories, instead of
protectorates or ocean vessels.
The most overlooked point about Justice Brown's opinion is that
it was never good law. Due to the split opinions of the justices,
Justice Brown wrote the "opinion of the court" because he was the
tie-breaking vote. However, not one other justice joined in his
opinion, prompting the humorist Finley Dunne to remark, "Mr.
Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, eight justices
dissenting."" Even so, Justice Brown's opinion is very important
because scholars,m the federal district courts, 9 8 and even the
defendants in Tuaua,'9 keep citing it as if it were good law. In fact,
Justice Brown's extension doctrine has been completely repudiated,
even recently.2' The controlling opinion of Downes, and that which
withstood the test of time, was Justice White's concurrence.
2. Justice White's Concurring Opinion
Justice Edward White, with two other justices joining, developed
a new test for applying the Constitution to the island territories. To
begin, he undertook an exhaustive analysis of the international laws
and nations' ability to conquer territory. Based on this law of
conquest, he determined that when a nation overtakes new territory,
inherent in its treaty-making powers, it has the ability to impose
restrictions as it sees fit.20' This initially seemed like a victory for the
extension theory espoused by Justice Brown.
However, Justice White also recognized that the United States
government received its powers strictly from the Constitution, so the
Constitution must still operate over Congress' power in the
195. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
196. McGovney, supra note 101, at 617.
197. Clanton, supra note 118, at 152-53.
198. Rabang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 515 U.S. 1130, 1133 n.5 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1130 (1995). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Rabang has been
followed by the Second (Valmonte v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 136 F.3d 914
(2d Cir. 1998); Third (Lacap v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir.
1998)); Fifth (Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010)); and D.C. Circuit Courts
(Licudine v. Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-34 (D.D.C. 2009)).
199. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 13-14 (adopting the Rabang
court's analysis of Downes).
200. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727 (rejecting the extension doctrine: "[Tihe
Constitution has independent force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of
legislative grace.").
201. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 312-13 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
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territories. But while the Constitution did indeed follow the flag, it
did not necessarily do so in full. Justice White created a distinction
between incorporated and unincorporated territories. An
incorporated territory was one destined for statehood, and the
Constitution applied in full.2m But where a territory was not on track
to become a state, it was unincorporated and the "question which
arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-
evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable."2 03
To determine whether a specific provision of the Constitution
applied to an unincorporated territory, the court must determine
whether the restrictions on Congress's power are "so fundamental a
nature that they cannot be transgressed." 2" This would eventually be
clarified as a test of whether the provision is a "fundamental right"
that follows the flag to the territories.205  The creation of
unincorporated territories and the holding that only fundamental
constitutional rights applied came to be known as the Incorporation
Doctrine.
B. The Incorporation Doctrine Applied
The Incorporation Doctrine represented a significant change in
the law. It stated that the Constitution still followed the flag, ex
proprio vigore, except when it did not. Citizenship was still subject to
the doctrine of jus soli, except when it was not. Incorporation was
determined on a case-by-case basis. Neither Downes nor the rest of
the Insular Cases provided much guidance as to whether a territory
was incorporated or unincorporated, or how to determine a
fundamental right. Nevertheless, although it was a mere plurality
opinion, by 1922 the Incorporation Doctrine became firmly
established as the law.20
1. Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Territories
It was simply taken for granted that the islands gained from the
Spanish-American War were unincorporated. 207 In fact, islands like
202. Id. at 311-12.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 371.
205. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1904) (holding that jury trials in
the Philippines are not a "fundamental right").
206. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
207. Downes, 182 U.S. at 344 (White, J., concurring) (Puerto Rico was
unincorporated); Dorr, 195 U.S. 138, 144-45 (the Philippines were unincorporated).
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Guam were considered mere military bases without any constitutional
rights.2" The Philippines were unincorporated because the treaty
with Spain specifically stated that the civil rights and the political
status of the inhabitants "shall be determined by Congress."2 " In the
1903 case of Hawaii v. Mankichi, the Court held that the language of
the resolution annexing Hawaii in 1898 did not serve to incorporate
the territory.210 This was true even though the resolution prohibited
laws "contrary to the Constitution of the United States."211 While the
Court conceded that reading the resolution literally would suggest
that the U.S. Constitution did apply, it determined that Congress
must surely have had a different intent.212 Instead, the resolution did
not intend to make any change to the laws that would imperil "the
peace and good order of the islands." 213 Thus, the Constitution did
not apply and Hawaii remained unincorporated until express
language was used in 1900 to incorporate the islands.214
On the other hand, Alaska was deemed incorporated in
Rassmussen v. United States, even though Congress did not make such
incorporation explicit.1  Unlike the Philippines, the treaty with
Russia that purchased Alaska granted the inhabitants the "enjoyment
of all the rights, advantage and immunities of citizens of the United
States." 216 The Court found this sufficient, especially since it could not
find any evidence of a contrary intention.217 It also acknowledged that
Congress had by statute extended a number of laws to the territory
that inferred incorporation, and that Downes had identified Alaska,
along with Florida and Louisiana, as examples of incorporated
territories.218 It remained unclear, though, what was to become of the
208. Kent, supra note 38, at 170 (citing Guam-Spanish Law-Condemnation of
Property, 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 59, 61 (1903)).
209. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143.
210. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 216 (1903).
211. Id. at 209.
212. Id. at 212.
213. Id. at 214.
214. Id. at 210-11.
215. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905).
216. Id. at 522 (quoting the Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions
in North America by His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of
America (Alaska Purchase), U.S.-Russ., art. 3, Mar. 30, 1876, 15 Stat. 539).
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 355 (1901) (White, J., concurring)).
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"uncivilized tribes" of Alaska who were specifically excluded from
the rights, advantages and immunities of the United States.219
By 1922, the implicit reading of Congress' intent was replaced
with a strict requirement of express incorporation. The Supreme
Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico used the same criteria it had used in
Rassmussen, but determined that Puerto Rico was not incorporated. 2 0
Puerto Rico had been organized through the Jones Act of 1917, which
also conferred U.S. citizenship. While citizenship implied
incorporation for Alaska, it would not do so for Puerto Rico. Balzac
held that the days of determining incorporation by inference were
over. Since the Incorporation Doctrine had been around for some
time, "incorporation is not to be assumed without express
declaration, or an implication so strong as to exclude any other
view."221 The Jones Act did not use the word "incorporate," so
Puerto Rico was not incorporated even though its inhabitants had
obtained citizenship.222
Though never explicitly stated by the courts, many
commentators have noted that race plays a large part in the
incorporation determination. 223 Alaska was considered easy to reach
from the United States and would probably be inhabited by
Caucasians. 224 The other territories, "peopled by savages," would stay
unincorporated.225
It still remains unclear just how treatment of incorporated
territories differs from unincorporated territories. While the right to
a jury trial only applied to incorporated territories, other provisions
had mixed results. For example, Downes held that the Uniformity
Clause did not apply to Puerto Rico because it was an unincorporated
219. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America (Alaska
Purchase), U.S.-Russ., art. 3, Mar. 30, 1876, 15 Stat. 539.
220. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922).
221. Id. at 306.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag Into United
States Territories or Can It Be Separately Purchased and Sold?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
707 (1994); Laughlin, Application of the Constitution, supra note 172, at 346; LEIBOWITZ,
DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 17-26; Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of the
Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 823, 827 (1926).
224. Laughlin, Application of the Constitution, supra note 172, at 354; Alan Tauber,
The Empire Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories, 57 CASE W.
RES. 147 (2006); Robert A. Katz, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the
Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 779 (1992).
225. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904)
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territory.226 But three years later, the same Court held that the same
constitutional provision did not apply to Alaska either, even though it
was incorporated.227
2. Fundamental vs. Procedural Rights
The second distinction the Incorporation Doctrine created was
between fundamental and non-fundamental rights as they applied to
unincorporated territories. Justice White described these
fundamental rights as "principles which are the basis of all free
government which cannot be with impunity transcended." 28 Beyond
that there was very little guidance as to what was fundamental.
In 1904, the Court in Dorr v. United States held that the right to
jury trial did not apply to the Philippines.229 The first case to actually
use the phrase "fundamental right," it held that it would be absurd to
force a procedural system on a population not ready to receive it
where "the result may be to work injustice and provoke disturbance
rather than to aid in the orderly administration of justice." 23 0 In other
words, if the right is procedural and its implementation would disturb,
or be disturbed by, the local culture, then the Constitution does not
force that right upon the people. Such a right might be said to be
impractical. The right to jury trial was also denied to pre-1900 Hawaii
on the same basis.21
Another procedural right, the right to a grand jury indictment,
was denied to the Philippines in Ocampo v. United States. The
Court determined that grand jury indictments were not inherent in
the fundamental right of Due Process, and so they did not apply to
the islands.233 That a jury trial was nonfundamental was reaffirmed
for Puerto Rico in Balzac v. Porto Rico in 192 2 .234 Balzac also
represented the first time a solid majority of the Supreme Court
agreed on the Incorporation Doctrine, officially becoming the law of
the land.
226. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
227. Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495-96 (1904).
228. Downes, 182 U.S. at 290-91 (White, J., concurring).
229. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149.
230. Id. at 148.
231. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,218 (1903).
232. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1914).
233. Id. at 98.
234. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
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Over the last century, the Insular Cases and the Incorporation
Doctrine have been widely criticized by scholars. In articles with
titles like, "The Supreme Court Should Overrule the Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine and End One Hundred Years of Judicially
Condoned Colonialism," 235 "The Insular Cases: The Establishment of
a Regime of Political Apartheid,"a and "The Land that Democratic
Theory Forgot," 237 commentators from across the spectrum have
decried the Doctrine for the way in which it creates a second class of
citizens. However, this disdain in academia has not swayed the
Supreme Court, which upheld the Incorporation Doctrine as recently
as 2008 .
C. Reid v., Covert: New Life in the Old Incorporation Doctrine
For the next 35 years, the Supreme Court remained silent on the
Incorporation Doctrine. . When finally reviewed, the Insular Cases
were not even cited for a case involving the territories. Instead, in
1957, the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert considered the issue of
whether a civilian at a U.S. military base overseas could be tried by a
military tribunal.239 Mrs. Covert was the civilian spouse of a U.S. Air
Force Sergeant stationed in England.2 4 While there, she killed her
husband and was found guilty by a military tribunal without a jury.241
The question was whether she could be tried by a military tribunal, or
must be afforded a civilian jury trial.
Justice Black wrote the plurality opinion of the court, with three
justices joining. He started with the ex proprio vigore premise that the
United States only derives its powers from the Constitution. "The
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.. .. It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution." 242 This language echoed the Downes dissent of Chief
235. Carlos R. Soltero, The Supreme Court Should Overrule the Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine and End One Hundred Years of Judicially Condoned Colonialism,
22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (2001).
236. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political
Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 283 (2007).
237. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land that Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J.
1525 (2008).
238. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
239. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1957).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 4-5 (noting that the case was consolidated with another similar case
involving Mrs. Dorothy Smith, who killed her Army husband at a base in Japan).
242. Id. at 5-6.
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Justice Fuller more than half a century earlier: "The government of
the United States is the government ordained by the Constitution,
and possess the powers conferred by the Constitution ... those limits
may not be mistaken or forgotten."243 Stemming from this
proposition, Justice Black attacked the Insular Cases and the
Incorporation Doctrine:
While it has been suggested that only those
constitutional rights which are "fundamental" protect
Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or
otherwise, for picking and choosing among the
remarkable collection of "Thou shalt nots" which were
explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of
the Federal Government by the Constitution and its
Amendments.244
He argued that the "very dangerous doctrine" of the Insular
Cases threatened the very basis of American government and should
not be expanded. 245 He further admonished that if foreign affairs are
of such a nature that the U.S. cannot act within the confines of the
Constitution, then the Constitution should be amended rather than
ignored.246 Justice Black was forced to distinguish the Insular Cases
rather than overturn them because four justices were not enough to
overturn the Insular Cases' precedent.24 7 In fact, without a majority,
the law of the case is "that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." 248  While
Justice Black had four justices join his opinion, Justice Harlan's
* * 249concurrence was the narrower opinion.
Justice Harlan agreed with the plurality that the Constitution
generally applied abroad, but recognized that not all provisions
"necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place." 20
While there was no rule that a provision of the Constitution could
never apply abroad, there was also no rule that a provision must
243. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 358 (1901) (Fuller, J., dissenting).
244. Reid, 354 U.S. at 9.
245. Id. at 14.
246. Id.
247. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 185, at 347.
248. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,325 (2003)).
249. Reid, 354 U.S. at 348.
250. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
108 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:1
always apply abroad, if execution would be "impractical and
anomalous."251
For Justice Harlan, the Insular Cases still had vitality and
remained the law of the land.252 Unlike Justice Black who would
constrain (or even overturn, if he had a majority) the Incorporation
Doctrine, Justice Harlan actually sought to expand and further define
it. Even for those rights deemed nonfundamental, the Court still had
to continue the analysis to determine whether the right should apply.
The "impractical and anomalous" test became the basis of
determining which provisions applied abroad by considering the
"particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives." 253 Having bolstered the Insular Cases, Justice Harlan
then applied this test to the facts of Reid, and determined that as a
capital offense, it was not impractical or anomalous to grant the
defendant a jury trial, though a lesser offense may have reached a
different conclusion.254
As the narrowest opinion, Justice Harlan's "impractical and
anomalous" test became the standard applied to the Territories for
judging which rights apply. The constitutional issues surrounding the
Insular Cases have consistently left the courts divided. Every
significant case failed to find a majority, or has split circuits. The
Incorporation Doctrine was created by the narrowest of margins in a
plurality opinion from Downes, and was upheld and expanded by the
even narrower margin of just one man in Reid.
D. Interpreting Reid: A Split Between Circuits
Rather than clarify the Incorporation Doctrine, Justice Harlan's
new test only served to cause more confusion. The courts have
struggled since Reid to make sense of the myriad concurrences,
pluralities, and vague tests created for the territories. The fight over
jury trials served as the basis for many of the Insular Cases, and
continued to guide post-Reid decisions.
For example, in Torres v. Delgado, the District Court of Puerto
Rico held that the jury trial was a fundamental right that was not
251. Id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring). Interestingly, Justice Harlan's grandfather
wrote a dissenting opinion in Downes that more closely aligned with Justice Black's
position. "In my opinion, Congress has no existence and can exercise no authority outside
of the Constitution." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. Reid, 354 U.S. at 77-78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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impractical and anomalous, and was thus applicable in Puerto Rico.25
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that jury trials
were applicable to American Samoa, but used only the "impractical
and anomalous" test to reach that conclusion."' Then, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered just the "fundamental
rights" tests to determine that jury trials did not apply to the
Northern Marianas." The conflict between the D.C. Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit has raised issues that are important to resolve for the
Tuaua case.
1. The D.C. Circuit: Putting "Impractical and Anomalous" into Practice
In 1972, Jake King, a U.S. citizen living in American Samoa, was
tried for failure to pay Samoan income tax. The High Court of
American Samoa denied his request for a jury trial, citing Balzac v.
Porto Rico for the proposition that jury trials were not afforded to the
territories. 2 8 Even before going to trial, King filed against the
Secretary of the Interior as administrator of American Samoa to
declare that the denial of a jury trial was unconstitutional." The
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction, but it was heard by the Court of Appeals.
Both sides conceded that only "fundamental rights" applied to
the territory. However, King argued that the recent decision in
Duncan v. Louisiana had overturned the old Insular decisions like
Balzac v. Porto Rico.2 6 In 1968, Duncan had held that jury trials were
a fundamental right for purposes of applying the Sixth Amendment to
the states via the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The D.C. Circuit Court rejected this argument,
stating that Duncan only applied to States, and reaffirmed that the
Insular Cases still controlled in the territories.262 In effect, there were
now two different definitions of "fundamental rights" depending on
whether a court was considering the states or the territories.
255. Torres v. Delgado, 391 F. Supp. 379, 381 (D.P.R. 1974). The court went on to
hold that unanimity by those juries was not fundamental, and thus not applicable. Id. at
383.
256. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
257. Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1984).
258. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1142 (D.C. Circ. 1975).
259. Id. at 1143.
260. Id. at 1146-47.
261. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
262. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d at 1147.
110 [Vol. 41:1
Interestingly, concepts like "fundamental" and "unincorporated
territory" were not controlling on the court's decision. Instead, the
court held that a decision could only be reached by reviewing how a
jury trial would apply to American Samoa today using the
"impractical and anomalous" test of Justice Harlan in Reid.26 3
Determining whether jury trials would be impractical and anomalous
in American Samoa was largely a question of fact that required an
evidentiary review of the American Samoa laws and customs, so the
Court remanded the case back to the district court to make a
decision.2 6
The district court in King v. Andrus held an extensive trial on the
question of holding jury trials in American Samoa.265 The American
Samoa government argued against jury trials on the grounds that
family, chiefs, and culture knit the Samoan people too closely and,
thus, they would never convict one another for fear of offending
somebody they knew. The other concern raised was the ifoga
ceremony, in which an offender's family offers apologies to the
victim's families. The government feared that no jury would convict a
266defendant whose family had conducted an ifoga ceremony.
Reviewing each of these concerns, the district court found that
the cultural obstacles had been eroded by "western world
encroachment." 267  Population explosions diluted the close
relationships of the aiga, and Samoans already ran a complex justice
system with Samoans arresting and prosecuting Samoan defendants
before Samoan judges.2 6 It also found that the ifoga was rarely
practiced anymore, and had no effect on the prosecution of individual
offenders either in American Samoa or Western Samoa.269
The court then proceeded to note the significant advancements
to the education system, the structure of government, the judicial
system, and how Americanized the Samoans had become, while still
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1148.
265. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11 (D.C. Circ. 1977), remanded from sub nom. King
v. Morton, 520 F. 2d 1140 (D.C. Circ. 1975). Interior Secretary Rogers Morton left office
in 1975. Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus took the office in 1977 and became the new
defendant in this case. This article will refer to the cases collectively as King, or the King
cases.
266. Id. at 12-13.
267. Id. at 14.
268. Id. at 13-14.
269. Id. at 15.
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maintaining their Samoan traditions.270 The court felt that under the
present circumstances, there was nothing preventing jury trials in
American Samoa.271 Jury trials were no longer too impractical and
anomalous to be applied to the territory.
King represented an incredibly important doctrine: The
practicality of a right can change over time. In 1911, the High Court
of American Samoa, while under the exclusive control of the U.S.
Navy, held that jury trials "would not be practicable" in American
Samoa because the "natives are uncivilized and incapable of self-
government."272 King now stood for the proposition that
circumstances over the last sixty years had changed, and without the
racism of the past, there was no more reason to believe jury trials
were impractical. Even if a right is denied in the past, it can be
granted later if it is no longer impractical.
Many of the witnesses in King regarded this new right as
desirable, but something that the American Samoans should do on
their own. Similarly, the critics of the Tuaua plaintiffs have made the
self-determination plea central to their argument.273 This is a belief
widely shared in American Samoa. While the King Court
sympathized with this view, it did make clear that the desires of the
Samoans could not play a part in the determination of whether a right
was impractical or anomalous.274 It would be improper to deny rights
to individuals who should enjoy them while they wait for American
Samoa to come to a decision.
In Tuaua, Judge Leon dismissed the relevance of King because
the defendant was a U.S. citizen, so it did not affect nationals.275
However, Judge Leon did not seem to recognize the full extent of
King in making such a conclusion. The King case was not in any way
limited to U.S. citizens. The evidentiary hearing asked whether a jury
trial could be held in American Samoa, not whether it could be held
there just for U.S. citizens. Tellingly, the holding provided jury trials
across the territory, to citizens and nationals alike. To claim that
270. Id. at 15-17.
271. Id.
272. Am. Sam. Gov't v. Willis, 1 Am. Samoa 635, 646 (App. Div. 1911).
273. Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66, at 4.
274. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.C. Circ. 1977), remanded from King v.
Morton, 520 F. 2d 1140 (D.C. Circ. 1975).
275. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *6 (D.D.C. June
26,2013).
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King was limited to citizens is a drastic misreading of the case, and
fundamentally underestimates its importance to the jurisprudence.
2. The Ninth Circuit: Relying on the "Fundamental Rights" Test
a. CNMI v. Atalig
In 1984, jury trials were again the center of dispute in
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used a different approach than the
D.C. Circuit. 276  Atalig did not mention the "impractical and
anomalous test" or the D.C. Circuit's reasoning. Instead, it referred
back to the original Insular Cases to review the "fundamental rights"
test. The Court sought to determine whether the right is one of
"those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are
the basis of all free government." 277  It very quickly determined,
considering the long history of this very question, that jury trials were
not fundamental, and thus did not apply to the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI").278
b. Wabol v. Villacruisis
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit returned to the CNMI in
Wabol v. Villacruisis.' The case considered an equal protection
challenge to racial prohibitions on the sale of land to those not of
CNMI descent.2"o The court again considered whether the right, in
this case Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, was
fundamental and was the basis for all free government.2' In doing so,
the court added to the definition of fundamental right, describing it as
one which incorporates the "shared beliefs of diverse cultures" to be
viewed in an "international sense."28
Wabol also considered the Reid "impractical and anomalous"
test, citing the D.C. Circuit in King. For the Ninth Circuit, though,
"impractical and anomalous" was a way of determining whether a
right was fundamental, not necessarily a test of its own. Through this
276. Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984).
277. Id. at 690 (quoting, in part, Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904)).
278. Id. at 690-91.
279. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
280. Id. at 1451.
281. Id. at 1460.
282. Id.
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mechanism the court sought to find the "delicate balance between
local diversity and constitutional command."m
The court first distinguished between procedural rights and
substantive rights. Substantive rights were personal and fundamental.
Procedural rights were simply a means through which to ensure
substantive rights. For example, a jury trial was a procedure utilized
to ensure Due Process-the former right being procedural and the
latter being substantive.' However, when analyzing rights, the court
must balance them against the preservation of Congress' power to
administer the territory in order to protect the unique cultural and
social conditions of the territory. The court would remain cautious
about undermining Congress.28 5
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit held that it would be
impractical to rid the CNMI of the racial restrictions on land because
it was a substantial piece of the Covenant that led to the CNMI's
annexation to the United States. It would also be anomalous for the
Equal Protection Clause to force the U.S. to break its pledge to
protect and preserve the CNMI culture.m The court rephrased the
issue to ask whether there was a right to long-term access to
Commonwealth real estate, and due to the unique qualities of CNMI
land scarcity and culture, it found that this right was not fundamental
in the international sense.s
Of course, the reframing of the right at issue in Wabol was
certainly suspect. Questioning whether there is a right to long-term
access to Commonwealth real estate downplays the infringement.
The real question should have been whether there is an Equal
Protection right to be free of racial discrimination in buying land,
which had already been answered.m One commentator suggested a
telling analogy: while there may be no fundamental right to eat at a
particular lunch counter, the government cannot restrict anyone from
being served due to his or her race.29
283. Id. at 1461.
284. Id. at 1460.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1462.
287. Id.
288. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that racial restrictions on
property violates the Equal Protection Clause).
289. Herald, supra note 223, at 727 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
151-52 (1970)).
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Regardless, the Ninth Circuit in Wabol indicated that the
"fundamental rights" test and the "impractical and anomalous" test
should both be used in determining whether a constitutional right
applied to a territory. Wabol's focus on the particular characteristics
of the territory in question also echoed the evidentiary trial in King
regarding the ability of American Samoa to hold a jury trial.
Somewhere between the D.C. Circuit in King and the Ninth Circuit in
Wabol there lies a test for determining the application of the
Constitution to the territories.
V. A Framework for Applying the Constitution to Territories
Despite this labyrinth of conflicting opinions, tests, and
competing priorities, there exists a sustainable framework through
which to analyze the application of constitutional rights to the
territories. In attempting to create a framework for applying the
Constitution to the territories, I join a long line of legal scholars who
have tried to unify these competing holdings.2 9
A. Unifying the Tests
The difficulty in arriving at a simple framework is that the D.C.
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have used very different tests to reach
their conflicting conclusions. The former relied entirely on the
"impractical and anomalous" test and the latter relied solely on
"fundamental rights." While others have analyzed this dichotomy
exhaustively, the most likely explanation is that the differences
resulted merely from a matter of taste.9 1 So then: how to choose
between the two tests?
The Insular Cases created the "fundamental rights" test. This
formula, originally described in Downes v. Bidwell,29 has been used in
almost every major case concerning the Constitution's application in
290. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OGC-98-5, U.S. INSULAR
AREAS: APPLICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/og98005.pdf; Daniel E. Hall, Curfews, Culture, and
Custom in American Samoa: An Analytical Map for Applying the U.S. Constitution to U.S.
Territories, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 69 (2001); Katz, supra note 224; Laughlin,
Constitutional Structure, supra note 53, at 385; Maurice H. McBride, The Application of the
American Constitution to American Samoa, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325 (1974); James R.
Thornbury, Sumario: A Time for Change in the South Pacific?, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1099
(1998).
291. Katz, supra note 224, at 791.
292. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 290-91 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
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the territories. Downes also indicated a strong presumption, though
rebuttable, that the Constitution does apply in a territory.293
However, since Reid, many courts have utilized Justice Harlan's
"impractical and anomalous" test.294 The Ninth Circuit in Wabol
appears to be the first court to attempt to bring these two tests
together. The court first determined that the issue at question was
separate from the substantive right of Equal Protection. It then held
that overturning the racial restrictions on land would be impractical
and anomalous because it would undermine the Covenant and
threaten CNMI culture.295 Interestingly, the court also noted that
because it was "impractical and anomalous," it was therefore not
fundamental in the international sense.9
Some have interpreted Wabol's definition of "fundamental right"
as one that is not "impractical and anomalous," suggesting that the
new test throws out the international understanding of
fundamentalness in favor of a reflection of just the local cultural
settings.2" While Wabol certainly focused on the local situation in
determining whether the right at question was impractical or
anomalous, it had already determined that the right was not the same
as the fundamental right of Equal Protection. In fact, Wabol was the
first modern case to truly emphasize and highlight that a fundamental
right should be in the "international sense."298 If "impractical and
anomalous" is not a definition of a fundamental right, then what is?
It is well settled that fundamental rights, those most personal
rights and privileges arising from the Constitution, which are the basis
of all free government, must apply to the territories. For those rights
that are not obviously fundamental, the default has been to assume
that they could never apply to the territories absent congressional
293. Id. at 292 (noting that where a territory is unincorporated, the "question which
arises is not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the
provision relied on is applicable"). See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)
("The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of,
and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply."); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (stating that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.").
294. See, e.g., King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Circ. 1975).
295. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450,1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
296. Id. at 1462.
297. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 185, at 361.
298. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
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action." However, Justice Harlan in Reid changed that assumption.
For those rights that would otherwise not be fundamental, he then
asks whether in that particular case they "should apply in view of the
particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives . . ."3" This view allowed the analysis to adhere to the
presumption that the Constitution applies to the territories, unless it
would be impractical and anomalous for a non-fundamental right to
be instituted. This balancing test is even bolstered by the Insular
Cases, which often considered the practicality of bringing new
institutions to inexperienced populations in the territories.30 ' Thus the
D.C. Circuit in King did not ask whether a jury trial was a
fundamental right, because the question had already been answered
in past cases.' Instead, the court considered whether a jury trial
should apply based on a local application of the "impractical and
anomalous" test.303 The test can be restated as follows: where a right
is not fundamental, it is still presumed to apply to the territories
unless it would be impractical or anomalous to do so.
Recent Supreme Court cases seem to favor the "impractical and
anomalous" test for determining how to apply nonfundamental
constitutional provisions abroad. In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion relied on the test to
determine that it would be impractical and anomalous to apply the
warrant provision of the Fourth Amendment to an alien abroad.3 0
The Court in Boumediene v. Bush used the test to hold that it would
not be impractical and anomalous to provide the writ of habeas
corpus to detainees in Guantanamo Bay Prison because the United
States had complete sovereign control over the territory of the base.o
These Supreme Court decisions do not undermine the "fundamental
rights" analysis. Instead, they distinguish between substantive rights
299. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Northern Mariana Islands v.
Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984).
300. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
301. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1904) (outlining the practical
difficulties of forcing jury trials upon "savages" who already have an established system of
justice).
302. See, e.g., Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984); Balzac,
258 U.S. at 298; Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147-48; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
303. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Circ. 1975).
304. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
305. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008).
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deemed fundamental, which will always apply, and those procedural
rights that apply only if it would not be impractical and anomalous to
do so.
B. Determining a Standard of Review
As constitutional questions, the courts must determine the
appropriate standard of review. The Supreme Court in Harris v.
Rosario required Congress to have a rational basis for treating
territories differently than states when enacting laws.?0 However,
constitutional rights are typically reviewed under higher scrutiny.
The trial court in Wabol used rational basis," but the Ninth Circuit
seemed to review the case with a hybrid that was somewhat less
demanding than strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a law must
be narrowly tailored to achieve a "compelling state interest.,,0 The
Ninth Circuit in Wabol concluded that the government had a
"compelling justification" for the land laws, but stated that such a law
need not be "precisely tailored" for the territories."
While not expressing a standard, the D.C. Circuit in King
reviewed the case on something more than rational basis, as it
brushed off the overwhelming testimony presented at trial of various
government interests in denying jury trials."o If the standard for
reviewing constitutional application to the territories is more than
rational basis-but not quite strict scrutiny-then what is it? Well-
noted territorial scholar Professor Stanley Laughlin suggested that
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate course and affirmative action
cases can act as a guide.311 This may be appropriate. However, no
courts have explicitly adopted this course of action.
C. Outline of a Framework
The case history creates a hybrid framework through which to
analyze whether a particular constitutional provision, such as the
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, will apply to a
territory. First, since it is settled that the full Constitution applies to
incorporated territories, the court must determine whether the
territory is incorporated or unincorporated. If unincorporated, the
306. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980).
307. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450,1453 (9th Cir. 1990).
308. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
309. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461-62.
310. Laughlin, Application of the Constitution, supra note 172, at 378.
311. Id.
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court must then ask whether the right in question is "fundamental."
If the right is fundamental, then it must apply to the territory, and all
territories, since the fundamental nature of the right does not change
at different locations. If not fundamental, then the court asks
whether it should apply. The presumption is that a constitutional
provision does apply unless it is impractical or anomalous to that
particular territory. Therefore, the court must ask whether it is
impractical to apply the provision, and then ask whether it would be
anomalous to do so. If it would be neither impractical nor anomalous
to implement, then the provision does apply to the territory in
question.
This is rephrased in the flow chart below:
I. Is the territory incorporated or unincorporated?
A. If incorporated, then the Constitution does apply.
B. If unincorporated, then must rely on the Incorporation
Doctrine.
II. Is the provision in question a fundamental right?
A. If yes, then the right does apply, and it applies to all
territories.
B. If no, then should it apply?
III. Would implementation of the provision be impractical in that
particular territory?
A. If yes, then the provision will not apply to that
territory.
B. If no, then continue with analysis.
IV. Would implementation of the provision be anomalous in that
particular territory?
A. If yes, then the provision will not apply to that
territory.
B. If no, then the provision does apply, but only to that
territory.
At the end of this analysis, there should be an answer as to
whether the constitutional provision applies to the territory in
question. Each of these questions will be explored in the following
sections.
D. Analyzing the Framework
This section analyzes the questions presented in the framework
in greater detail.
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1. Is the Territory Incorporated?
Before asking whether a constitutional provision applies, it must
first be determined whether the territory is incorporated.
Constitutional provisions apply to incorporated territories, but not
necessarily to unincorporated territories.312 The definition of an
unincorporated territory was never fully defined, leaving Justice
Harlan's dissent in Downes claiming that the "idea of 'incorporation'
has some occult meaning which my mind does not apprehend. It is
enveloped in some mystery which I am unable to unravel."313
However, an "incorporated" territory is most often described as one
that Congress intends to make a state at some point in the future.3 14
Annexation by the United States alone is not enough to
incorporate a territory.' Nor is the mere granting of citizenship.316
The determination today is mostly a political question. If
incorporation is intended, then Congress, the annexing treaty, or
organic documents must make it explicit; it is not to be determined by
"inference or construction."317  Only a significant, and expressed,
change in status will serve to incorporate a territory.
2. Is the Constitutional Provision a Fundamental Right?
Fundamental rights for purposes of a territory have never been
clearly defined. However, four important points can be discerned
from case law. First, fundamental rights are natural rights that are
more than constitutional rights. They are alternately described as the
"basis of all free government,"" "limitations in favor of personal
rights,"3 19 and fundamental in the "international sense" based on the
shared beliefs across cultures." These rights may be explicitly stated
in the Constitution, or may exist independently. 32 1 However, just
312. See generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287-344 (1901) (White, J.,
concurring).
313. Id. at 391 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314. See id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring). See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298, 311 (1922) ("Incorporation has always been a step, and an important one, leading to
statehood.").
315. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,217-18 (1903).
316. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311.
317. Id.
318. Downes, 182 U.S. at 291 (White, J., concurring).
319. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904).
320. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990).
321. Downes, 182 U.S. at 290-91 (White, J., concurring).
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because a right is stated in the Constitution, it does not mean it is
fundamental.
Second, the burden is on the party requesting the right to show
that it is fundamental. Every major decision reviewing fundamental
rights for the territories has placed the burden on the party seeking
the right. Moreover, the courts have generally taken a "cautious
approach" when overturning Congress's rules.322 While there is a
presumption that the Constitution does apply, it is not a presumption
that a right is fundamental.
Third, rights within the Constitution are to be determined
independent from one another. The Court will not simply apply an
entire constitutional amendment to the territory, but will dissect each
provision to determine whether it is applicable to the territory. For
example, the Fifth Amendment's general right of Due Process is
fundamental;'2 but, the Fifth Amendment's right to a grand jury
324 tindictment is not. While the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
has been repeatedly denied,325 there have been no serious challenges
to the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses or the right to an
326attorney.
Fourth, a nonfundamental right is generally a procedural right
rather than a substantive right. Procedural rights are a means to
obtain a substantive right,327 but are particular to our Anglo-Saxon
system of government." Fundamental rights, on the other hand, are
typically personal rights and liberties.329
Many rights have been held to be fundamental, including free
speech," the protection from ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder, the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures,332
322. See Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984).
323. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922).
324. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914).
325. See, e.g., Atalig, 723 F.2d at 682; Balzac, 258 U.S. at 298; Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. at 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
326. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
327. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990).
328. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310. See also Soto v. United States, 273 F. 628 (3d Cir. 1921).
329. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904).
330. El Vocero de P.R. v. P.R., 508 U.S. 147, 148 n.1 (1993) (noting that the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause "fully applies to Puerto Rico"); Posadas de P.R.
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 331 n.1 (1986) (same). In 1922, the Court in
Balzac had already assumed that First Amendment free speech protections applied to
Puerto Rico. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 314.
331. Dorr. 195 U.S. at 142.
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the right to privacy (in the context of abortions),' the right to
travel,3% the protections of the takings clause,335 Due Process,3 and
Equal Protection."'
Justice Black in Downes listed non-fundamental "remedial"
rights to include citizenship, suffrage, and those procedural methods
detailed in the Constitution "which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence."338 Other courts have included the right to trial by
13'0jury 9  and the right to an indictment by Grand Jurym as
nonfundamental rights.
The question is whether the constitutional provision relates to
substantive personal liberties, or whether it is a procedural safeguard
meant to enforce a separate right. If the Court determines that the
right is fundamental, then it applies to the territory. Since
fundamental rights are by their very nature the "basis of all free
government,"34 ' the conclusion is the same regardless of the territory,
so fundamental rights apply to all territories of the United States. No
independent analysis is required for each territory. If the right
applies, then the law in question is subject to normal constitutional
review. If the right is not fundamental, then the right does not
necessarily apply. However, now the Court must ask whether it
should apply, considering the presumption that the Constitution
applies to the territories unless it would be impractical or anomalous.
332. Torres v. P.R., 442 U.S. 465, 470 (1979).
333. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1992); Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332, 1341-42 (D.P.R. 1974). It should be
noted that despite these decisions, American Samoa still completely prohibits abortions,
making it a felony to conduct one unless the health or life of the mother is at stake. See
generally AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. tit. 46, ch. 39. It simply has not been challenged in
American Samoa.
334. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978).
335. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
336. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
337. See id.
338. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901). It is important to remember that
Justice Black's list does not necessarily state the law. After all, no other justices joined his
opinion.
339. See, e.g., Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984); Balzac
v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
340. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914).
341. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147.
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3. Would it be Impractical to Apply to the Territory?
When the analysis has reached the "impractical and anomalous"
test, the burden shifts. While the burden in the "fundamental rights"
test was on the party seeking the constitutional right, the party
seeking to keep the provision out of the territory carries the burden
for the "impractical.and anomalous" test. This is in keeping with the
presumption that the Constitution does apply, unless it would be
impractical or anomalous. For example, the D.C. Circuit in King
required the American Samoa Government, who was trying to avoid
jury trials, to show that "circumstances are such that trial by jury
would be impractical and anomalous."3" The court failed to find
sufficient evidence from the government that offering a jury trial
would be impractical or anomalous?
Like most of the terms, "impractical" in the sense of the
territories has never been clearly defined. The Insular Cases
referenced the impossibility of bringing a right to practice where the
right would ignore the "established customs" and be "unsuited to
their needs."3, The actual use of the phrase "impractical and
anomalous" arose from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid.
He used it as a test to balance the right at issue with the "particular
local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives.""
The impractical prong of the test primarily relies on the logistics
of implementing the right. While a constitutional right cannot be
withheld by mere inconvenience or expediency,346 if the local
conditions and/or culture are such that it cannot be effectively
implemented, then it is sufficiently impractical. The U.S.
Government Accountability Office has described the analysis not as
focusing on cost effectiveness, but on policy considerations such as
"equity, justice, and cultural preservation.""
Such impracticality must be unique to the particular
circumstances of the territory in question.' The territory cannot
argue that a right would be impractical if it would be equally
342. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Circ. 1975).
343. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 16-17 (D.C. Circ. 1977), remanded from King v.
Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Circ. 1975).
344. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
345. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
346. Id. at 110.
347. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1124T, AMERICAN SAMOA:
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SOME FEDERAL COURT OPTIONS 34 (2008).
348. See King, 452 F. Supp. 11; Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
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impractical to a state.349 The territory must have special circumstances
that would make it uniquely impractical. One commentator provided
the example of the Fourth Amendment: The protections it provides
may let guilty men go free, but that would not be uniquely impractical
to the territory (or the states).5 o
The D.C. Circuit in King relied heavily on whether the cultural
setting would prevent the right to a jury trial from being
implemented. Ultimately, it found that the culture had evolved to
such an extent that it would no longer be impractical to implement
jury trials. 351 The Ninth Circuit in Wabol focused on the political and
diplomatic concerns of overriding the Covenant between the territory
and the United States, which formed the political union. The court
believed it would be extremely impractical to force a right in direct
contrast to a condition of the agreement between the United States
and the CNMI people.352
It is important to remember that in determining practicality one
must consider the changing circumstances over time. It is not enough
to simply cite an older case. Instead, an analysis of the present
situation is required. As the Supreme Court has stated: "It may well
be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its
unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of
constitutional significance."3 13 It was this recognition of a changing
relationship that led the D.C. Circuit in King to conduct a full
evidentiary hearing to review American Samoa's ability to implement
jury trials.354
In short, impracticality in the modern sense refers to whether the
local culture and conditions today are such that it would be
impractical to implement the right. In other words, do the
circumstances hurt implementation of the constitutional provision? If
so, then the provision will not be implemented in the territory.
4. Would it be Anomalous to Apply to the Territory?
Justice Harlan sought to evaluate whether a right was
"impractical and anomalous."' His analysis weighed the practical
349. See Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 185, at 353.
350. Id.
351. See King, 452 F. Supp. 11.
352. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461.
353. Boumediene v. Bush, 555 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).
354. King, 452 F. Supp. at 17.
355. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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difficulties of implementation against the seriousness of the right in
question."' The D.C. Circuit in King reviewed the case similarly,
attempting to determine whether the culture of American Samoa
would prevent the practical implementation of jury trials, and
ultimateiy determined that it would not."' King used the terms
"impractical and anomalous" as if they were synonymous, and then
tested for impracticality.' The Ninth Circuit in Wabol used a
different approach. While concluding that a right to CNMI property
would be impractical, it also asked a separate question of whether it
would be anomalous.
"Anomalous" is defined as incongruous, contradictory, or
inconsistent with the circumstances.36 Whereas the "impractical test"
asks whether the culture would inhibit implementation of the right,
the "anomalous test" asks whether the right would threaten the
culture. Such an interpretation of anomalous has been generally
accepted in the scholarship. 36' Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined
that implementing the right to equal access to land would threaten
the CNMI culture, which the Covenant was meant to protect:
It would truly be anomalous to construe the equal
protection clause to force the United States to break
its pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and
property. The Bill of Rights was not intended to
interfere with the performance of our international
obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a
genocide pact for diverse native cultures.
In its evaluation, Wabol asked whether the right would be
"impractical or anomalous" and found it to be both. 6' This "and/or"
distinction is very important.' One commentator suggested using the
356. Id. at 77-78.
357. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Circ. 1975.
358. King, 452 F. Supp. at 17.
359. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
360. Anomalous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com./dictionary/
anomalous (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
361. See, e.g., Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., U.S. Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions:
Colonialism or Reasonable Choice for Small Societies?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 429, 439-40
(2011).
362. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
363. Id. at 1461 (emphasis added).
364. See Katz, supra note 224, at 789; Hall, supra note 290, at 94.
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Ninth Circuit test when the right at issue is addressed by the
territory's organic documents, and using the D.C. test when it is not
addressed.365 This may be a useful distinction at times, and is helpful
especially when considering the organic documents' promises, but a
right that is not prohibited in a founding document could still be
dangerous to a local culture. Questioning whether a provision is
impractical or anomalous makes more sense. It is easy to imagine a
right that is impractical but not anomalous, or anomalous but not
impractical. Either one should be sufficient. It would be absurd to
conclude that a right must apply because it is not anomalous, but still
completely impractical to actually implement. Either impracticality
or anomaly would be enough to prevent the provision's application to
the territory.
VI. The Citizenship Clause in American Samoa
Since its annexation in 1900, U.S. citizenship has not been
conferred to the people of American Samoa. The United States took
it for granted that the people of American Samoa were not citizens
even before the term "national" was ever defined. While citizenship
has long been denied to the territory, the government's interest in
maintaining Samoans' status as nationals is not clear. In Tuaua, the
court held that birthright citizenship is absolutely barred in
unincorporated territories absent congressional action, so presumably
the government's intent was irrelevant.3M
The general presumption that citizenship does not apply has
never been seriously considered. In the past, the courts looked to the
annexing documents to find Congress' intent with regard to
citizenship. In Rassmussen v. United States, the Court reviewed the
treaty with Russia ceding Alaska to the United States, stating that all
inhabitants (except the native tribes) would be granted the
"enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of
the United States."67 The Court read this to mean that the people of
Alaska became U.S. citizens once the treaty was signed.
365. Katz, supra note 224, at 804 ("[E]very personal right guaranteed by the
Constitution must be extended to such territories, unless a right's application proves to be
both impractical and anomalous.").
366. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 14.
367. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 522 (1905) (quoting Treaty
Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His Majesty the
Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America (Alaska Purchase), U.S.-
Russ., art. 3, Mar. 30, 1876, 15 Stat. 539).
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The Alaska Treaty can be compared with the Instrument of
Cession of Manu'a, which stated, "[Tlhere shall be no discrimination
in the suffrages and political privileges between the present residents
of [Manu'a] and citizens of the United States." 3 8 Like the Alaska
Treaty, this language suggested that there was no difference in the
rights of American Samoans and the rights of U.S. citizens?6 This
may help explain why the people of American Samoa believed they
were, in fact, U.S. citizens when they signed the Instruments of
Cession, and were utterly surprised twenty years later to learn that
the United States never granted them citizenship status.370
Even so, the Incorporation Doctrine provides significant room
for changing circumstances. In the same way that modern American
Samoa was prepared for jury trials, it may also be prepared for
citizenship. Analyzing the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment through the Incorporation Doctrine framework
developed above will help determine whether it applies to American
Samoa. The first line of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment
reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside." 71
In the Tuaua case, the defendants' argument hinged on the
phrase "in the United States," arguing that American Samoa is not
part of the United States for purposes of the Constitution.37 2 Judge
Leon agreed.7  However, the definition of "United States" is not as
clear as the opinion made it. Congress has defined "United States" to
include the "continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States."374 The latter
three are unincorporated territories that are not included in Judge
Leon's definition of United States. While they have statutory
citizenship, they do not enjoy Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
citizenship. Prior to the Insular Cases, it was well settled that the
"United States" included all possessions, including districts and
368. Manua Cession, supra note 32.
369. At least was true for the people of Manua. The Cession of Tutuila and Aunuu
does not contain such language.
370. See Statement of Chief Liu, 1930 Hearings, supra note 97, at 229.
371. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
372. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 13-15.
373. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *9 (D.D.C. June
26, 2013).
374. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (2006).
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territories."' The Insular Cases identified a new category of
unincorporated territories that Justice White described as "foreign to
the United States in a domestic sense." 376
Citing Justice Brown's opinion in Downes and a series of cases
concerning the Philippines, the Tuaua defendants claimed that the
language differences between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments stand for the proposition that the citizenship clause was
never meant to apply to the territories.7 In Rabang v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to the
states of the Union, not territories like the Philippines. 7 ' To come to
this conclusion, Rabang relied entirely on Justice Brown's analysis in
Downes, in which the Fourteenth Amendment's failure to add the
phrase "or any place subject to their jurisdiction" suggested a
territorial limitation on the citizenship clause.379
The Tuaua defendants and Judge Leon heavily emphasized that
Rabang's conclusion had been repeated in many other circuits. While
it had been repeated, it had not been thoroughly vetted. The Second
and Fifth Circuits cited Rabang and Justice Brown's analysis in
Downes to come to the same conclusion that the Philippines were not
part of the United States.3" The Third Circuit did not bother to do
any analysis at all, and simply cited Rabang to issue its opinion."' The
D.C. Circuit cited these prior cases to reach the same conclusion.
And Tuaua cited them all to bolster its argument.38 Judge Leon also
made much of the Ninth Circuit's recent holding in Eche v. Holder,
which concluded that the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution
did not apply to the CNMI.38 However, Eche relied entirely on
Rabang and Justice Brown's arguments.385
375. Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 319 (1820).
376. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,341-42 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
377. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 13-15.
378. Rabang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 35 F.3d 1449, 1452-53 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 130 (1995).
379. Id.
380. Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279, 282-84 (5th Cir. 2010); Valmonte v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 136 F.3d 914, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1998).
381. Lacap v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 138 F.3d 518, 519 (3d Cir. 1998).
382. Licudine v. Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129, 134-35 (D.D.C. 2009).
383. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 13-15.
384. Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012).
385. Id. at 1031.
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The problem, of course, is that all of these cases rested on the
premise that Justice Brown's opinion in Downes was good law. While
Justice Brown did indeed discuss the territorial limits of the United
States for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, no other justice
joined in his opinion. Justice White's plurality Incorporation
Doctrine, which did not discuss the Fourteenth Amendment, became
the law of the land-not Justice Brown's. This has been discussed
earlier in this article, but it bears repetition and emphasis since his
opinion is repeatedly cited as the law of Downes.' Even Judge Leon,
who recognized that Justice Brown's opinion was not controlling, still
believed that the Philippines cases arose from the proper decision
from Downes and based his decision on theirs."
Outside of Justice Brown's opinion, the Insular Cases do not
provide much guidance as to a definition of "United States" for
purposes of the citizenship clause. While the territories were within
the United States for the Uniformity Clause,3" they were not for the
Revenue Clause.389 The one thing that is clear from the Insular Cases
is that they tended to work on an issue-by-issue basis and did not rely
on a definition of "United States." Even the court in Rabang
admitted that no other court had addressed the meaning of "United
States" within the Fourteenth Amendment.3
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide many
answers either. The citizenship clause distinguishes between the
"United States" and individual "States.""' Most of the prohibitions
found in the Amendment relate specifically to the States, so that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States."392
386. Justice White's opinion in Downes begins on page 287, which is useful to keep in
mind when reading claims about the "holding" of the case. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 287 (1901) (White, J., concurring). Many citations, in the case law and the
scholarship, attributed to Justice White are actually from Justice Brown's opinion.
387. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *13 (D.D.C. June
26, 2013) ("These courts relied extensively upon Downes to assist with their interpretation
of the Citizenship Clause.").
388. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
389. See Downes, 182 U.S. 244.
390. Rabang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 35 F.3d 1449,1452 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 130 (1995).
391. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
392. Id.
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Similarly, Due Process and Equal Protection are not to be infringed
by "any State."39 3
It is clear that the term "State" only refers to states, not other
entities under U.S. sovereignty like territories .3 That there is a
difference between the Constitution's references to "States" versus
"United States" has long been recognized.3 95 Yet the courts have also
held that Due Process and Equal Protection do apply to the
territories, even though they are not states.396 In so doing, the courts
placed these fundamental rights above any supposed territorial
limitation implied by a reading of "United States" as only comprising
states. Would any court deny a U.S. jurisdiction the protection of a
fundamental right, one that is the basis of all free government, on the
belief that the Constitution was somehow limited to the states of the
union? Such a conclusion is doubtful when the courts have applied
even the procedural right to jury trial all.the way to England,3" and
the right to habeas corpus to a military base in Cuba."
Therefore, a determination of whether "United States," for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, means just the states of the
union or includes all U.S. jurisdictions is not dispositive, and may not
even be relevant to whether the citizenship clause applies to the
territories. The boundaries of the United States for purposes of
citizenship should depend more upon jurisdiction and allegiance than
on textual differences between various amendments. If the right is
fundamental, then it must apply, even if the area is just an
unorganized, unincorporated territorial possession of the United
States. Further, if a non-fundamental right is not too impractical or
anomalous to apply, then it must be carried to the territory. The
Incorporation Doctrine holds that Congress must comply regardless
of how "United States" is defined.
393. Id.
394. Ferstle v. Am. Sam. Gov't, 4 Am. Samoa 2d 160, 162 (1987) (citing District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) ("[Tihe District of Columbia is not a "State"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.")).
395. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872).
396. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976);
Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990); Craddick v. Territorial Registrar,
1 Am. Samoa 2d 10 (App. Div. 1980).
397. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
398. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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VII.Applying the Framework to Citizenship
in American Samoa
The framework developed in Part V can help determine whether
a right, such as constitutional citizenship, applies to a territory. This
Part will analyze the application of the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the territory of American Samoa using
the framework outlined above.
A. Is American Samoa Incorporated?
American Samoa is generally recognized as unincorporated.
None of the parties in the Tuaua case argued that American Samoa
had become incorporated, or that any change in the political status
had occurred, or was desired. The United States government
recognized the unincorporated status of the territory," and American
Samoa has not made any significant efforts to change that status.
Incorporation requires a clear congressional intent to make a
territory a state-not even an organic act coupled with citizenship will
suffice for incorporation.' None of the federal laws concerning
American Samoa even hint at an intent to incorporate." What is less
clear is the time when American Samoa became an unincorporated
territory. This question may be important if birthright citizenship is
granted retroactively.
The United States first exercised sovereignty over American
Samoa (then known as "Eastern Samoa") in 1899 with the closing of
the Spanish-American War. At the time, President McKinley
announced that Samoa would be placed under a military government
controlled by the Navy.'? The chiefs of Tutuila and Aunu'u signed
the Instrument of Cession in April 1900,' and the chiefs of Manu'a
signed their Instrument in 1904.' Congress ratified the Instruments
of Cession in 1929.' The Navy retained absolute control over the
399. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-655, ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM FOR ADJUDICATING MATTERS
OF FEDERAL LAW 11-12 (2008).
400. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
401. See generally 48 U.S.C. ch. 13 ("Eastern Samoa").
402. Kent, supra note 38, at 169.
403. Tutuila Cession, supra note 31.
404. Manua Cession, supra note 32.
405. Ratification Act, supra note 39.
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territory until it was transferred to the administration of the
Department of Interior in 1951.'
American Samoa was under military government, unsupervised
by Congress, until 1929, and a congressionally sanctioned military
government until 1951. This was not a unique situation. Guam was
also under a military government run by the Navy from its annexation
in 1898 until its organic act in 1950.' Cuba was under a U.S. military
government from 1898 until its independence in 1902." These areas
controlled solely by the military were not even considered
unincorporated territories, and it was generally assumed that none of
the Constitution applied. In one of the lesser known Insular Cases
concerning Cuba-Neely v. Henkel-the Supreme Court recognized
that, in an international sense, Cuba was conquered territory and thus
domestic; but, since it was on the path to independence, it remained a
foreign nation for purposes of its relationship with the United
States.' This type of distinction sounded very similar to Justice
White's opinion in Downes, but with a very important exception.
Because a military government ran Cuba, it remained a. foreign
country. As such, even though it was completely under the
sovereignty of the United States, none of the constitutional rights
applied. The rights denied included the writ of habeas corpus, bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, trial by jury, and the fundamental
guarantees of life, liberty, and property.410
Similar discussions took place concerning the military
government of Guam, though the courts did not weigh in. In 1903,
the U.S. Attorney General wrote that the Constitution did not extend
to Guam or Samoa because their governments were under the
complete authority of the Executive as Commander in Chief.411 In
1946, the Navy insisted that the Constitution did not apply to
American Samoa, and as late as 1949, a congressional committee
reported that it did not apply to Guam.412
406. Exec. Order No. 10264, supra note 40.
407. Kent, supra note 38, at 167-68.
408. Id. at 121.
409. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 120 (1901).
410. Id. at 122. The Supreme Court took a very different view in its recent decision
that the right of habeas corpus applied to prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
411. Kent, supra note 38, at 170 (citing Guam-Spanish Law-Condemnation of
Property, 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 59, 61 (1903)).
412. Id. at 172.
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The U.S. Government did not recognize Guam as an
unincorporated territory until 1950, when it was declared as such in
the Guam Organic Act.413 American Samoa's federal laws do not
mention incorporation at all.414 However, as early as 1975, it was
described as unincorporated by the courts.415 With the transfer of
authority from the Navy to the Secretary of Interior, the territory
ceased to be under a military government, and became more akin to
Puerto Rico or the Philippines during the era of the Insular Cases.
Therefore, American Samoa most likely became an unincorporated
territory in 1951, and any retroactive application of a right like
citizenship would begin at that date.
B. Is Birthright Citizenship a Fundamental Right?
When applying the Constitution to unincorporated territories,
the first question is whether the provision represents a fundamental
right. A fundamental right is a personal right that is considered the
basis of all free government, and is shared across cultures in the
international sense. It should be substantive rather than procedural,
and the burden rests with the party seeking to implement the right in
the territory. Justice Brown's opinion in Downes specifically listed
citizenship as a nonfundamental, remedial right.416 However, since his
opinion was not controlling, the question may still be reviewed.
Before the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark
held that the "Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and
fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory." 417 More
recently, the Supreme Court has taken a stronger position that
citizenship is a right, rather than just a procedural privilege. In Trop
v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion described
citizenship as a "fundamental right" that is not subject to control by
the general powers of the U.S. Government.418 In Afroyim v. Rusk,
the Supreme Court used stronger language: "The very nature of our
free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of
law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive
413. Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. § 1421a (1950) ("Guam is declared to be an
unincorporated territory of the United States.").
414. See generally 48 U.S.C. ch. 13 ("Eastern Samoa").
415. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1142 (D.C. Circ. 1975) (stating that "American
Samoa is an unincorporated territory of the United States").
416. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901).
417. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (emphasis added).
418. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1958).
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another group of citizens their citizenship."419 The Court explained
that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to take
that power from Congress.42 0 While these cases dealt with the
revocation of citizenship to one who already obtained it-whether by
birth or naturalization (the Court did not believe that it mattered)-
the arguments were strongly in favor of protecting citizenship as a
right.
However, when considering whether a right is fundamental for
the territories, one must consider the international understanding of
the right, and consider how the right applies across all free
governments. A review of the history of citizenship presents a much
broader picture of the doctrine.
The concept of citizenship goes back to the ancient Greeks, who
understood it as an outline of the political body, and a way to define
the relationship between the people and the state.421 Importantly,
citizenship for the Greeks contained not only membership in the
polity, but also the possibility of some public action, such as voting or
holding office.422 The Romans relied heavily on the concept of
citizenship and used it as a tool. Within Roman citizenship, the law
recognized different classes, each with its own rights and privileges.423
Occasionally, Rome would even grant foreigners Roman citizenship
or confer it upon conquered territory, but Rome created a series of
lower-class citizenship classifications for these groups.424 Medieval
Europe's citizenship was broken down according to the kings, lords,
parishes, and even guilds to which an individual was subject.425
Citizenship is often defined by nationality or ethnicity, rather
than just location. Israel gives priority to Jews and France retains its
unique "Frenchness" even as it grants citizenship to others. 426  A
person born in France to non-French parents may only be a citizen
when he reaches the age of eighteen, has lived in France for five
419. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
420. Id.
421. PAUL MAGNETTE, CITIZENSHIP: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 7 (ECPR Press,
2005) (2001).
422. Id. at 9-10.
423. Id. at 8 (The classes were the potestas (the people), the imperium (magistrates)
and the auctoritas (the Senators)).
424. Id. at 21 (statuses included civis, Latinus, civis sine suffragio, and socius iniquo
foedu).
425. Id. at 36-37.
426. CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY 10 (Charles Tilly ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996).
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years, and has committed no crimes.427 Until recently, Germany
functioned on the doctrine of jus sanguinis, or citizenship by blood.
Citizenship was based on the parents' status, not place of birth. The
law was changed in 1999 to permit birthright citizenship if at least one
parent was a legal resident of Germany and living in the country for
at least eight years.42
The English common law did not distinguish by race, but only
considered whether the individual was born within the sovereignty
and owed allegiance to the British crown.4 29 The United States, after
independence, adopted the English common law concepts, but
changed the word from "subject" to "citizen."" Until the twentieth
century, there was only one type of citizen in the U.S. The term
"national" was not used by Congress until 1940.431
Today, all free governments understand civil rights within the
framework of citizenship. As one commentator put it, "citizenship is
the right to have rights." 432 The converse helps underscore the rule.
Statelessness-in which a person is not a citizen or national of any
state-is a cause of international concern. 433  The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights declared that "everyone has the right
to a nationality." 434 The U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons provided a framework of protection for those
without a nationality.435 The international community widely
427. Kerber, supra note 129, at 834.
428. Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz [StAG] [Nationality Act] Jan. 1, 2000, § 4 (Ger.). The
Nazi Reich revoked German citizenship from Jews and created a second-class status for
them called Staatsangehorige (state affiliates). See Reich Citizenship Law, English
translation at the University of the West of England, available at ess.uwe.ac.uk/
documents/citizen.htm.
429. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *366.
430. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 136 (1830).
431. Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(22) (1940).
432. Pujol, supra note 162, at 230.
433. See, e.g., Hugh Massey, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series: UNHCR and
De Facto Statelessness, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
(UNHCR) (Apr. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.
html?docid=4bc2ddeb9&query=statelessness.
434. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GAOR Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/810
at 71 (1948), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doclRESOLUTION/GENINRO/043
/88/IMGINR004388.pdf?OpenElement.
435. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, June 6, 1960, 360
U.N.T.S. 117, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=TREATY
&mtdsg no=V-3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en. The United States is not a
signatory to the Convention, as Mikhail Sebastian learned when he was stranded in
American Samoa. Sebastian had lived in the U.S. as a stateless refugee. When touring
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considers membership of a nation to be a fundamental right,
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However,
there is no such consensus that a single type of citizenship is required.
Many countries retain varying tiers of citizenship and the methods for
determining these classes are largely procedural.
U.S. nationals are afforded most of the protections of the United
States and are certainly not stateless. At its core, citizenship is a legal
status.4 6 The distinction between a citizen and a national is
procedural, not substantive. Unfortunately, the Tuaua opinion did
not address these questions, instead relying on Justice Brown's
interpretation via the Philippines cases. But, the question still
remains as to whether citizenship is truly fundamental.
Those against granting citizenship could persuasively argue that
the national status does satisfy the international, fundamental right to
membership of a nation, so denying birthright citizenship would not
be a violation of a fundamental right. Of course, those in favor could
counter that a multi-tiered system of citizenship is anathema to the
American concept that "all men are created equal."437 The doctrine
of equal citizenship would prohibit the government from treating
members of the polity as a lower class due to the stigmas a caste-
system creates.438 While a U.S. national status may technically qualify
as fulfilling the "fundamental rights" test in an international sense, it
may be just too contrary to the values of this country to continue.
C. Would the Provision be Impractical to Apply to American Samoa?
Even if a court determined that the citizen status is not a
fundamental right that must be granted to the territories, it must still
inquire whether it should apply to American Samoa. This change in
tests shifts the burden to the party arguing against the right's
application to the territory. The presumption is that the Constitution
American Samoa, he took a brief trip to independent Samoa, thus violating the conditions
of U.S. residency. He was denied reentry to Hawaii until the U.S. Citizenship
Immigration Service relented to public pressure and granted him "humanitarian parole"
and let him return to the mainland. Audio: Stateless and Stranded on American Samoa,
NPR (Oct. 7, 2012), available at www.npr.org/2012/10/07/162445840/stateless-and-
stranded-on-american-samoa. Moises Mendoza, Back From Samoa: Stateless man allowed
entry into U.S., GLOBALPOST (Feb. 16, 2013), available at http://www.globalpost.com/
dispatch/news/regions/ americas/united-states/130215/samoa-stateless-us.
436. Kenneth L. Karst, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977).
437. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
438. Karst, supra note 436, at 6-7.
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does apply to territories, unless it would be impractical or anomalous
to do so.
Impracticality must be more than simple inconvenience or
expediency, and must be unique to the cultural and social situation in
American Samoa. It would need to be argued that Samoan culture
would somehow hinder the ability of the United States to offer
birthright citizens to the inhabitants of American Samoa.
For example, the United States would need evidence that
American Samoa culture would make it impractical to allow
citizenship absent an English and civics test, or a moral character
review, which are currently required for naturalization. They may
even have to show that it would be impractical to allow those born in
American Samoa the right to vote when located in a state, or hold
public office, or serve on a jury. The latter being particularly difficult
as the D.C. Circuit has already determined that American Samoa
itself can sustain jury trials.439 Instead, a court could decide that it is
more impractical to keep the plaintiffs as nationals and continue to
deny those rights than it would be to simply grant citizenship.
Impracticality is a politically dangerous argument to make, which
may explain why the defendants and the court declined to make
arguments regarding the "impractical and anomalous" test. Similarly,
Representative Faleomavaega did not make any impracticality claims.
His arguments rested almost entirely on the fear of anomalous effects
to the culture.
It is unlikely that anyone would find it impractical to grant
citizenship to American Samoans. Quite the contrary, American
Samoans would be welcomed members of this nation's citizenry.
Most American Samoans have strong allegiances to the United
States, and have family and friends throughout the country. They
have a proud tradition of serving in the American military. During
the second Iraq War, more American Samoans died per capita than
from any other U.S. jurisdiction."o Samoa's culture has not prevented
an American education system, a republican system of government
modeled on the United States, or a judiciary completely controlled by
the U.S. Department of Interior. Indeed, the culture has embraced
many aspects of America and would not hinder citizenship. While the
fa'asamoa may leave some constitutional provisions impractical to
apply to American Samoa, there is no evidence that birthright
439. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.C. Circ. 1977).
440. Mark Potter, Eager to Serve in American Samoa, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 5, 2006),
www.nbcnews.com/id/11537737.
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citizenship is one of them. The key aspects of the fa'asamoa include
the aiga, the matai system, and the communal land tenure. None of
these would have any foreseeable effects on birthright citizenship in
the United States. There being no evidence that American Samoa's
culture would make birthright citizenship impractical, the court must
then ask whether it would somehow be anomalous to American
Samoa.
D. Would the Provision be Anomalous to Samoan Culture?
An anomalous effect would be one that forced the United States
to break its pledge to preserve the Samoan culture."' This pledge was
codified in the Instruments of Cession, in which the United States
agreed to allow the local matai to retain power over the villages,"2 and
the right to keep their property according to Samoan custom."' To be
anomalous, citizenship would need to threaten the foundations of the
fa'asamoa.
Of course, no analysis can foresee the potential consequences to
a culture. Ultimately, such foresight is impossible. There is a Samoan
saying, "'aua le gagaua le laau a o mata," loosely translated to "don't
break the tree branch while it is still green."4" Change always brings
uncertainty, and so long as Samoans feel their culture could even
theoretically be threatened, they will fight against any change.
However, it is possible to analyze the arguments of those who claim
anomalous results to determine whether such fears are justified.
The Tuaua case did not make much of an anomalous argument,
but Representative Faleomavaega's amicus briefs very strongly
warned that citizenship could act as the first domino, leading to
application of the entire Fourteenth Amendment including Equal
Protection, and through the Due Process Clause incorporate the
entire Bill of Rights, which would wipe away Samoa's unique
culture."
First, it is important to note that this argument is not that
citizenship is somehow anomalous to Samoan culture, but rather that
citizenship will lead to the application of other constitutional
441. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
442. Tutuila Cession, supra note 31, § 3.
443. Manua Cession, supra note 32.
444. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, An Unincorporated and Unorganized U.S. Territory: Is
This What American Samoa Wants?, SAMOA NEWS (May 25, 2012), http://www.
samoanews.com/?q=node/5511.
445. Faleomavaega Amicus, supra note 8, at 13.
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provisions, which may be anomalous. While a constitutional
provision may contain many rights, each one must be evaluated
independently. The Fifth Amendment's fundamental right of Due
Process applies to the territories," as do the Miranda rules," even if
the Fifth Amendment's nonfundamental right to a grand jury
indictment does not."8 Therefore, application of the citizenship
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will not automatically apply the
other provisions of the Amendment.
Second, Due Process does not apply constitutional provisions to
the territories, only to the states. In Duncan v. Louisiana the
Supreme Court changed the meaning of "fundamental rights" as they
applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to include provisions like jury trials." While
Duncan and the Insular Cases both refer to "fundamental rights,"
both the Ninth Circuit in Atalig and the D.C. Circuit in King have
stated firmly that Duncan does not apply to the territories, and that
the incorporation doctrine remains the law.450
Citizenship would not cause the domino effect of constitutional
application that Representative Faleomavaega fears. However, these
arguments have been so pervasive that some of the concerns should
be analyzed further. Especially since the stakes-the survival of an
entire cultural system-are so high. This article will consider two of
the main arguments made by Representative Faleomavaega as to why
citizenship would erode the fa'asamoa.
1. Granting Citizenship Would Change the Political Status of the
Territory -
Representative Faleomavaega argued that granting citizenship to
the people of American Samoa would be equivalent to shifting the
political status to an incorporated territory.451 He fears that such a
drastic change in the political status would cause the U.S.
Constitution to take "full force and effect" and overwhelm the
446. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922).
447. See Am. Sam. Gov't v. Pino, 1 Am. Samoa 3d 186 (1997).
448. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914).
449. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,156 (1968).
450. See Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Applying Duncan to the territories "would repudiate the Insular Cases. We are not
prepared to do so nor do we think we are required to do so."); see also King v. Morton,
520 F.2d 1140, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
451. Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66, at 5-6.
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fa'asamoa.452 Fundamentally, he posited that citizenship is akin to
organization and incorporation.
It is important to note that citizenship has been granted to all of
the other territories, albeit by organic act rather than the
Constitution.453 While the organic acts did change the political status,
they were the cause of citizenship, not the result. Citizenship without
an organic act would not suddenly organize the territory since
organization by its very definition requires a statute enacted by
Congress.
Neither would it cause incorporation. While all of the other
territories have citizenship, none of them have become incorporated.
The Supreme Court in Balzac clearly stated that citizenship, by itself,
does not lead to incorporation of a territory; incorporation must be
explicitly stated by Congress.454 In Tuaua, Judge Leon specifically
rejected the defendants' argument that citizenship was a way of
forcing statehood.455  The incorporation doctrine has continued to
apply to the territories even as the inhabitants enjoyed birthright
citizenship. Most importantly, vital cultural interests such as the
preservation of native lands have been preserved even though the
people were citizens, partially on the basis that it would be anomalous
for the court to overturn the United States' promise of cultural
protections.456 Since organization and incorporation both require
explicit congressional action, no court's application of a single
constitutional provision, especially citizenship, could cause such a
change in political status.
452. Id.
453. Puerto Rico was organized by the Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act), 48 U.S.C.
§§ 733, 736, 738-40, 744 (1994) (original version at ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900). But
citizenship was not granted until the amendments of the Jones-Shafroth Act (Jones Act),
ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917)); Approval of Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1801, art. III (1976); Revised Organic Act of the
Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1541 (1954); Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. § 1421
(1950) (repealed and re-enacted by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §
1407 (1952)).
454. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 311-13 (1922) (Incorporation must be "taken
by Congress deliberately and with a clear declaration of purpose, and not left a matter of
mere inference or construction.").
455. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *7-8 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2013).
456. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
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2. Citizenship Implies Equal Protection, Which the Fa'asamoa Cannot
Survive
Representative Faleomavaega also argued that equal protection
is implicit in citizenship,457 a belief he no doubt adopted from the
conclusions of a 1961 Senate study mission. 458 The introduction of the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is usually
cited as the single largest constitutional threat to the fa'asamoa.
Equal Protection, the argument goes, will automatically strip the
territory of its cultural traditions, since many of them are couched in
terms of race.45 9 Racial restrictions on real property have been
roundly rejected by the Supreme Court over the last century.
Buchanan v. Warley prohibited states' racial restrictive zoning;4 60
Oyama v. California prohibited ancestry-based property ownership
rules;" and Shelley v. Kraemer prohibited racially restrictive
covenants in private sales of property.62
More recently, and close to home for Samoans, was Rice v.
Cayetano, in which the Supreme Court held that Hawaii's laws
granting special voting rights in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to
native Hawaiians was unconstitutional.4 63  The Court used the
Fifteenth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth in its decision, but
still subjected the law to a strict scrutiny analysis of the racial
restriction. To American Samoans, this was yet another warning of
the risks of federal judicial review.
The argument that Equal Protection is a threat to the culture
rests on two assumptions: (1) that the Equal Protection clause does
not already apply to American Samoa; and (2) that no cultural
protections could survive Equal Protection analysis. If these
assumptions were not sustained, then Equal Protection would not be
anomalous to the territory.
457. Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66, at 4.
458. 1961 Study Mission, supra note 92, at 9 ("It is highly probable that a majority of
the American Samoans desire citizenship, yet many are gravely troubled as to whether the
'equal protection of laws' doctrine implicit in citizenship would not conflict with the
'Samoan lands for Samoans' doctrine and the matai system.").
459. Faleomavaega Amicus, supra note 8; Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66, at 4-8.
460. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
461. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948).
462. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
463. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 524 (2000).
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a. The Equal Protection Clause Already Applies to American Samoa
The first assumption, that Equal Protection does not already
apply, is incorrect. In Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores, the
Supreme Court held that Equal Protection is a fundamental right that
does apply to the territories.4 The Court recognized that the
protections were derived either from the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses, but declined to make a determination about
which was the source.465 Instead, the Court held that it did not matter,
since they could both be applied to the territories. 66
American Samoa has already determined itself to be subject to
Equal Protection. In Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, the Appellate
Division of the High Court (the territory's highest court) determined
the constitutionality of the territory's racial restrictions on land
ownership.467 Specifically, the court was reviewing the law prohibiting
those who have less than one half Samoan blood from land
ownership.46 The racial restriction was clear to the court-especially
as it had already been held that the statute referred to anyone with
Samoan blood, not just American Samoans-so no political
distinction could be made.469
The court began its discussion with the clear and unequivocal
holding that "the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection are fundamental rights which do apply in the Territory of
American Samoa." 470  The court discussed the Fifth Amendment's
"explicit assurance of the equal protection of the laws" to hold that
equal protection was "so basic to our system of law that it is
inconceivable that the Secretary of the Interior would not be bound
by these provisions in governing the territories, whether 'organized,'
'incorporated,' or not." 471  While initially relying on the Fifth
Amendment, the court also cited the Fourteenth Amendment,
making no distinction between the two as far as equal protection was
464. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,600 (1976).
465. Id. at 601.
466. Id.
467. Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 Am. Samoa 2d 10 (App. Div. 1980). The
Appellate Division of the High Court is the highest level of appeal for American Samoa.
468. Id. at 11 (citing 27 ASC 204(b), which was amended and moved to AM. SAM.
CODE ANN. § 37.0204(b)).
469. Moon v. Falemalama, 4 Am. Samoa 836 (1975).
470. Craddick, 1 Am. Samoa 2d at 12.
471. Id. at 12.
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concerned.4 7 Though not citing it, the High Court mirrored the
Flores decision in not recognizing a difference between Fifth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal
protection beyond review standards.473
Since the High Court determined equal protection to be a
fundamental right, it was unnecessary to do an "impractical and
anomalous" analysis. Instead, the court conducted a strict scrutiny
review of the racially restrictive statute.474 Similar to Wabol, the High
Court relied heavily on the organic documents and the cultural
importance of land. Going back to the original raising of the
American Flag, the court noted that it was always the policy of those
governing American Samoa to protect the communal land for the
benefit of Samoans. 475 Recognizing that the "whole fiber of the social,
economic, traditional, and political patter in American Samoa is
woven fully by the strong thread which American Samoans place in
the ownership of land," the court found that the state's "compelling
state need to preserve an entire culture and way of life" survived a
strict scrutiny review."'
The D.C. Circuit seemed to agree that Equal Protection applied
to the territories as well. In Bishop v. Hodel, the court reviewed a
land dispute arising from American Samoa.477 In the case, the
appellants argued that they were denied equal protection because
American Samoa did not have an Article III court.478 The Court
agreed that Equal Protection did apply to American Samoa, but held
that Congress had a rational basis for treating American Samoa's
judiciary differently.
The fact that Equal Protection is a fundamental right that applies
to the territories is not dispositive of how it will be reviewed. Wabol
stood for the proposition that procedural rights cannot ride on the
coattails of the substantive rights under which they fall.4m So, the
procedural right to a jury trial did not extend to the territories along
472. Id. at 13 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
473. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1976).
474. Craddick, 1 Am. Samoa 2d at 12.
475. Id. at 13.
476. Id. at 14.
477. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
478. Id. at 384-85.
479. Id. at 385-86.
480. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).
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with the fundamental right of Due Process.48' And, the procedural
right to purchasing land did not extend to the territories along with
the fundamental right of Equal Protection.4
Thus, the assumption that Equal Protection does not already
apply to the territories is incorrect. So is the second assumption that
the fa'asamoa could not survive Equal Protection. Cases across the
country, from American Samoa in Craddick, to the D.C. Circuit in
Bishop, to the Ninth Circuit in Wabol, have consistently upheld the
cultural systems from attacks based on Equal Protection.
b. Samoan Culture Would Survive Application of Equal Protection
While there have not been many cases challenging Samoan
culture, most scholars agree that the culture would continue to
survive. Many have agreed that a federal district court would not
erode the fa'asamoa.48' Professor Stanley Laughlin concluded that
territorial cultures can sustain many constitutional challenges. 4M
Daniel Hall comes to a similar conclusion, specifically determining
that the Samoan curfew, or sa, would survive.485 Jeffrey Teichert
argued that the terms of the Instruments of Cession, which he
believes is a treaty between sovereigns, controls the terms of the
social contract between American Samoa and the United States. 41
Even Representative Faleomavaega agrees that the culture can
survive the Constitution, but believes that it is safer to eliminate the
opportunity to even bring such a challenge.'
Importantly, the courts have been especially protective of
cultural institutions that are enshrined in the original organic
documents, like treaties and instruments of cession. Wabol placed
heavy emphasis on the conditions of cultural protection found in the
481. Id. (citing Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1984)).
482. Id. at 1462.
483. Weaver, supra note 62. See Uilisone Falemanu Tua, Note, A Native's Call for
Justice: The Call for the Establishment of a Federal District Court in American Samoa, 11
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 246 (2001).
484. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 185.
485. Hall, supra note 290.
486. Jeffrey B. Teichert, Resisting Temptation in the Garden of Paradise: Preserving
the Role of Samoan Custom in the law of American Samoa, 3 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 35 (1999).
487. Faleomavaega Amicus, supra note 8, at 7; Faleomavaega Reply, supra note 66
("While Congressman Faleomavaega believes strongly that the preservation of fa'asamoa
would justify upholding [the matai requirement for Senators] under even strict-scrutiny
review, it is foreseeable that a change in the status of United States nationals in American
Samoa might make litigation challenging the requirement more likely.").
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Covenant with CNMI.4 Hodel agreed that the Instruments of
Cession in American Samoa evidenced a legitimate government
policy in protecting the fa'asamoa."' Many interests enshrined in a
treaty survive regardless of whether the territory was incorporated or
not. For example, the Treaty with France that annexed the Louisiana
Purchase kept provisions providing special treatment to French and
Spanish traders. Those provisions continued to apply to the
incorporated territory of Orleans, despite the Uniformity Clause.4 If
treaty provisions continue for incorporated territories that are subject
to the full control of the Constitution, then they would be even more
effective for unincorporated territories.
Equal Protection certainly applies to the territories, even while it
remains unclear as to what extent. Further, Congress has been
granted surprising leeway to avoid Equal Protection when dealing
with the territories, which suggests that so long as Samoan
discrimination is approved by federal statute, it can avoid challenge.4 9'
For more than a century all levels of government have stood behind
the Instruments of Cession and the policies towards protecting
Samoan culture. The courts have practically bent over backwards to
ensure that the pillars of the fa'asamoa are protected. Equal
Protection does not ride the citizenship clause's coattails, but even if
it did, it would not be anomalous to American Samoa.
The fears that citizenship would erode Samoan culture do not
bear out. When viewed through the Incorporation Doctrine, the
citizenship clause does not bring other constitutional provisions to
bear on the territories. Nor does it automatically change the political
status of the territory. As such, the citizenship clause is not
anomalous to American Samoa.
Conclusion
Tuaua presented a false choice. The parties and Court believed
that the whole question relied on whether the Insular Cases could be
upheld. Nobody considered whether the Insular Cases themselves
required an additional level of analysis. In the end, the D.C. Circuit
avoided a full analysis by simply stating that the Insular Cases
automatically meant denying citizenship. Such a conclusion was
488. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
489. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
490. Downes v Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 332 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
491. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 19, at 437.
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unnecessary and wrong. The question is not whether the Insular Case
do or do not apply, it is whether citizenship should be granted within
their rules.
A. Final Thoughts on Citizenship in American Samoa
The plaintiffs' argument that jus soli should trump over a century
of the Incorporation Doctrine, with no regard for the cultural
protections within the territories, was potentially harmful to the
territories. While the Insular Cases were originally a denial of rights
by a foreign power, their legacy has evolved to permit important
protections that help keep the territories' cultural institutions alive.
Without these protections, vibrant cultures would erode away and the
foundation of the United States' agreements with the people would
be undermined.
On the other hand, the defendants' argument and Judge Leon's
opinion that the Insular Cases stand for an absolute prohibition on
citizenship is just as harmful. Denying a territory the basic rights of
citizenship based on nothing more than a misreading of the strength
of Justice Brown's opinion in Downes is unacceptable in this day and
age. This argument is entirely based on the premise that if the United
States is not constitutionally forced to provide citizenship, it cannot.
The U.S. government should be pushed to explain its interest in
keeping American Samoans in their second-class status.
Whether the phrase "United States" includes more than just
states is not dispositive of whether the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to American Samoa, despite Justice
Brown's one-man opinion in Downes. American Samoa is clearly
within the jurisdiction of the United States. Justice White's
controlling plurality opinion, and the test used by every subsequent
court since, has been to determine whether the right in question is
"fundamental." That is the question the court should ask rather than
devolve into a dispute over how to define "United States."
While membership within a nation is certainly a fundamental
right, the U.S. national status may be a sufficient procedural means of
complying with that right. Thus, constitutional birthright citizenship,
as opposed to a national status, may not be fundamental in the
international sense. Of course, the question remains whether "all
men are created equal unless they are created in American Samoa" is
a viable rule domestically. Under the presumption that the
Constitution does apply to the territories, the analysis should
continue to Justice Harlan's balancing test in Reid to determine
whether application of the right to American Samoa would be
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impractical or anomalous. Even if birthright citizenship is not a
fundamental right, it is surely one that should apply.
The D.C. Circuit should have ordered an evidentiary hearing as
to the potential impracticalities and anomalies of applying citizenship
to American Samoa. Likely, it would have found that there is no
impracticality that has been (or can be) cited that would make
citizenship for American Samoans difficult to carry out. Nor is it
anomalous. Citizenship does not change the political status of
American Samoa, or suddenly import the full force of the
Constitution on the territory. The fa'asamoa would survive
citizenship unscathed, but American Samoans would finally become
full members of the American polity. It would not be impractical or
anomalous to apply the citizenship clause to American Samoa.
The Incorporation Doctrine provides a complex framework
through which a basic right, like citizenship, can be reviewed. It is not
necessary to force the entire Constitution on the territories, or
absolutely prohibit any of its provisions. The path through the
Incorporation Doctrine is the best way to provide the people of
American Samoa with constitutional birthright citizenship without
threatening the fa'asamoa or changing the political status.
Overturning these cases is unnecessary and potentially harmful to the
territories. Ultimately, the Incorporation Doctrine can and should be
utilized to find that the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to American Samoa, and that those born in
American Samoa are U.S. citizens.
B. A Proposed Policy for the National Status
Such a conclusion raises an interesting question about what to do
with the U.S. national status. Would such a status ever survive the
Incorporation Doctrine review? Is there a situation where a U.S.
national status would not be impractical or anomalous? The answer
may be found in the Tuaua court's heavy reliance on Rabang, and the
circuit court cases concerning the Philippines. Even though these
cases relied entirely on Justice Brown's opinion in Downes, that does
not mean their eventual outcome was incorrect.
United States policy has always treated new territories
differently. Alaska was incorporated upon annexation, whereas
Hawaii was not. Congress declined to organize American Samoa,
while around the same time granting Puerto Rico citizenship.
American Samoa, Guam, and Cuba all started under military
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governments. From the beginning, it was determined that Cuba and
the Philippines were always destined for independence.4 9 The
Philippines were the only unincorporated territory to gain eventual
independence, and may provide guidance as to the purpose of the
national status.
There was strong opposition to annexation of the Philippines by
the American public, especially when Filipino insurgents attacked
U.S. forces in 1899. 493 This insurgency, which lasted until 1902,
actually killed more Americans than the entire Spanish-American
War.4  Due to the unpopularity, the Senate only ratified the Treaty
of Paris with the clarification that it would not be a "permanent
annexation" of the Philippines. In 1916, Congress passed the
Autonomy Act, the preamble of which stated: "it is, as it has always
been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw
their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their
independence as soon as a stable government can be established
therein."4 6  This was followed up in 1934 with the Philippine
Independence Act, which set forth the procedures that would lead to
an independent government, and was accomplished with the
President's relinquishment of all claims of sovereignty in 1946.49
Using the Incorporation Doctrine, there is a strong argument
that applying a right such as citizenship to the people of the
Philippines during that time would be very impractical, considering
the clearly stated policy of the United States to return the Philippines
to independence. As such, a court could very easily hold that such a
right did not extend to the Philippines due to the local setting, the
necessities of the situation, and the available alternative-a
temporary U.S. national status.4 98
492. Congress conditioned President McKinley's intervention in Cuba with a
requirement that Cuba be left independent, and disclaiming any U.S. claim over the
island. The Treaty of Paris mirrored this by relinquishing Spain's control over Cuba, but
only granting the U.S. temporary occupation. See Kent, supra note 38, at 118-19.
493. Id. at 120.
494. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political
Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 283, 297 (2007).
495. Kent, supra note 38, at 120.
496. Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1950) (citing the Jones-
Shafroth Act (Jones Act), ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917)).
497. Id. at 799.
498. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (The right is
balanced against the "particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives.").
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American Samoa, on the other hand, is not on a temporary
transitional path towards independence or statehood." The
Instruments of Cession granted full sovereignty to the United States,
with no indication then, or since, that independence or incorporation
would follow. American Samoa has been under the U.S. flag for over
a century, and has developed extremely close ties with the country.
The old fears of racial and cultural clashes are no longer justifiable
today. The very permanence of American Samoa makes it extremely
difficult to justify denying citizenship to its people.
In Tuaua, Judge Leon specifically rejected the argument that
temporariness was relevant to whether citizenship applied to
American Samoa.5" From a constitutional perspective, he's probably
right. However, it does bear great weight on the matter of U.S. policy
regarding territories.
Denial of a right like citizenship should only be permitted as a
temporary measure, where it would be too impractical to carry out.
The United States should consider this as it determines what to do
with the U.S. national status. A new policy would need to follow
three important rules: (1) the U.S. national status is acceptable as a
temporary provision after the U.S. takes sovereignty over a territory;
(2) if circumstances appear that the territory is on the path to
independence, then the national status may remain until
independence is granted; and (3) if the territory is not on the path to
independence, then citizenship must be afforded to the people when
it is no longer impractical to do so.
Such a rule would have to be determined onca case-by-case basis,
but would not accept an indefinite national status. This rule would
also not rely on the political status of the territory-whether it is
organized or incorporated. American Samoa has remained
unorganized and unincorporated, but is clearly a permanent part of
United States sovereignty. The United States should adopt this more
just policy and avoid permanent second-class citizens.
Whatever the United States decides to do with the national
status in the future, it should certainly agree that American Samoans
are worthy to be citizens of this country. There is plenty of room
within the Constitution to add a few more citizens without any harm
to U.S. interests, foreign or domestic. The D.C. Circuit should have
taken the full question of citizenship into consideration-not by
499. Nor are Guam, CNMI, the United States Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico.
500. Tuaua v. United States, No. 12-1143-RJL, 2013 WL 3214961, at *14 (D.D.C. June
26,2013).
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disregarding over a century of precedent, but by using the
Incorporation Doctrine to find that the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment can, should, and does extend to the people
of American Samoa. There is no need to continue to have second
class Americans, and American Samoans deserve the full rights and
privileges of constitutional citizenship.
